Disclaimer: This piece by Dr. Pingali Gopal is with permission from Chittaranjan Naik. The article is a summary of a five-part article written by Chittaranjan Naik on an online forum for discussing Advaita. The ideas and the themes solely belong to the latter. Dr. Pingali Gopal claims no expertise or primary scholarship in the subject matter. The purpose of the article is to hopefully stimulate the readers to explore further. One can access the full article of Sri Chittaranjan Naikji here:
APAURUSHEYATVA OF THE VEDAS BY CHITTARANJAN NAIK
This was first published in PRAGYATA online magazine. The links to the summary article provided at the end of the present article.
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PART 1
INTRODUCTION
Growing up in Indian culture, to the question by any inquisitive child ‘Who wrote the Vedas?’, the typical answer by a family adult or a spiritual guru or teacher would be that they have no human author or are apaurusheya. Most of the time, the answer satisfied us and we raised no further questions because that is how beings in Indian culture behave when the claims of our scriptures do not exactly tally with our school history and geography lessons. As we grow older perhaps, the historicity of our texts starts troubling us and it becomes sometimes difficult to believe that the Vedas could be both eternal and without a human author. It is more convenient for us to believe that humans do not have proper historical records of the ancient times and apaurusheyatva means that we do not know the names of the author(s) of the Vedas. However, this discomfort does not come in the way of most Indians holding a deep value to Indian scriptures, especially the Vedas. The scriptures and their chanting are still an integral part of our lives.
Advaitic Vedanta remains the pinnacle of our darshanas and its all-inclusive universal vision is indeed the explanation of this (laukika) and the transcendental world (alaukika). Dr. Chittaranjan Naik was surprised in one online forum discussing Advaita that many did not accept the idea of apaurusheyatva of the Vedas. As a response, he wrote a detailed five-part article explaining what this means and how we need to accept and respect this idea. As an aside, Chittaranjan Naik mentions that the establishment of this idea is more detailed and explicit in the Dvaita texts of the Madhavacharya school. Amongst the darshanas (or philosophies), Purva Mimansa argues in great detail to establish the apaurusheyatva of Vedas. Advaita does not spend much effort but accepts the Mimansa doctrine. The author relies mainly on the translations of Jaimini Purva Mimamsa Sutras by Ganganath Jha and the translation of Kumarila Bhatta’s Slokavartika for the article. He did face a lot of difficulties in accessing those important books, a reflection of how lackadaisical we are in protecting our traditions and culture. But that is another story.
THE RELATION BETWEEN APAURUSHEYATVA AND FLAWLESSNESS
There are three primary pramanas (means of knowledge) known as pratyaksha (perception), anumana (inference), and Agama (Scripture). The first two are the means to know about empirical objects whereas the third is the means to know about things beyond the reach of the senses. While there are a great many things that lie beyond the reach of the senses, the primary object to be known by Agama is Brahman only. All other topics are its subsidiaries.
The prameya is the object to be known; pramana is the means to obtain knowledge of the object. Two things are crucial here: (i) adopting the appropriate means and (ii) ensuring that the means are free from defects. An Agama- the means to obtain the Supreme knowledge about Brahman, thus should be free of defects as a necessary condition. However, its flawlessness needs to be known beforehand and not after obtaining Brahmajnana. It, therefore, requires an external mark by which it may be known that it is a flawless pramana.
Agamas are composed of words. Words reside in conscious beings, not in inert things, and they issue out of conscious beings in the form of speech. Now, a defect in a product has always a defect in the producer as its cause. Even if the materials constituting a product are defective as an immediate cause, it remains the defect in the producer for not being able to recognize the defective material. What are the causal factors that cause defects to arise in conscious beings?
There are three capacities that characterize every conscious being: iccha (desire or will as the primary driving force), jnana (knowledge), and kriya (action). Knowledge of an object precedes every action invariably as without knowledge, there can be no motive for action. Action leads to the accumulation of merits and demerits. The store of karma of an individual conscious being, i.e., the cumulative aggregate of all the jiva’s unfructified past actions, is adrshta. By their own nature, the mind, intellect, and the sense organs, are unlimited and without defects; it is a jiva’s past karma, or adrshta, that limits the intellect and sense organs of a jiva and also causes defects to arise in them.
It is the presence of adrshta that sustains the individualities of diverse beings. This is true not only of the jivas born on earth but even of perfected human beings. Thus, any Agama that comes from an individual being, even if such a being is a perfected being, cannot be flawless. Why? Because the perfected being was a jiva striving for perfection before the attainment of perfection. This is the argument that Sri Shankara presents when confronted by the Buddhists with the proposition that the Agamas that have come from Buddha are reliable and flawless. Sri Shankara replies that even if Buddha was a perfected being, still, he is different from God because he has a history of striving for perfection whereas God, being eternally unchanging and immutable, has no history. The emphasis on past history to differentiate a perfected being from the Supreme God is due to the potential effects of adrshta in the former. Perfection removes the ignorance of the (now) perfected being, but it does not nullify that part of accumulated past action (prarabda karma), which continues to operate in the world. Hence, the scriptures that issue out of such perfected beings, cannot be impeccable and flawless.
What about Agamas that have come from God who is free of adrshta and thus any defects? The crucial factor here is the ‘dependency on the adrshta of beings to whom the scripture is given’. Thus, even if God is perfect, the adrshta of the people who receive the scripture limits the scope of the scripture. God is ever full and Self-fulfilled. So, there can never be a motive for His creation. Hence, as an analogy, He creates the universe as a Leela or sheer Sport. The only reason attributable to the actions of God is the adrshta of individual beings. God creates the universe in accordance with the adrshta of beings, and even the Agamas that He gives to people are determined by their peculiar dispositions. Such scriptures, Vishesha Dharma for those specific people, cannot be appropriate pramanas for revealing the Supreme Knowledge of Brahma-Vidya.
The dependency of such scriptures on the adrshta of people brings in the factor of the ‘adhikara’ of those people. It is known from the scriptures that there are many ‘stations’ in the spiritual realm that a jiva may attain, such as apavarga, vaikunta, etc. Therefore, to treat these scriptures indiscriminately as a means for obtaining Brahma-Vidya would be incorrect. The arguments do not necessarily conclude that limits exist even to scriptures given by God. Indeed, there are some scriptures, such as the Bhagavad Gita, which are accepted as flawless. But the vital point here is the possession of an inherent mark by which the scripture becomes flawless and not limited by the adrhstas of people. It is not possible for anyone to know the invisible adrshtas of people nor is it possible for anyone to fathom the reasons that God has in giving specific scriptures to mankind. Thus, it becomes impossible to fix a mark by which one may say with certainty that only particular scriptures originating from God have the scope of being flawless Pramanas.
A scripture for obtaining Supreme Knowledge that would possess such a mark of flawlessness has to be necessarily uncreated, undetermined by the specific adrshtas of beings, and be existing naturally in the Nature of God Himself as an eternal archetype of Dharma. Such a scripture would be independent of the causal factors that cause any of the deficiencies. This Scripture, being uncreated by any being, not even by God, would be Apaurusheya and would be the basis not merely of vishesha dharma but of an Eternal and Universal Dharma, that is, Sanatana (eternal and unchanging). Any scripture that reveals dharma in some aspect or another would have its roots in such a Sanatana Dharma. Only an Apaurusheya Agama would possess both the attributes (flawless and possessing the mark of being flawless) for it to be an unquestionable Pramana for Brahma-Vidya. Any other scripture capable of imparting such knowledge would necessarily be grounded in such a Primary Apaursheya Scripture.
WORDS, OBJECTS, FLAWLESSNESS
A word is a sign that attaches to an (other) object. A word would not be a word if it did not have an object as its meaning. An object also always attaches to a word as its meaning. An object, by itself, can never be flawed. The truth of an object is the thing ‘as it is’. Faults in an object always arise in relation to a valuation that exists in a conscious being. Water simply exits ‘as it is’. If we did not need to drink water, both pure and murky, water would be without any defects attracting the label of ‘fit’ and ‘unfit’. The locus of defects in objects is not in the objects of the world, but in the valuations, desires, and purposes that conscious living beings have.
The same principle for objects does not however apply to knowledge. The latter is not flawed on account of its failure to achieve a purpose but is flawed when it fails to know the object ‘as it is’. This is what adhyasa is – one thing known as another. A flaw in knowledge is essentially avidya and an object known through such a flaw Is adhyasa. This is of two kinds: adhyasa with respect to substance; or adhyasa with respect to attributes. Adhyasa with respect to substance occurs when, though knowing the meaning of both objects, one mistakes one for another (like a rope for a snake). Adhyasa with respect to attributes occurs when the attributes of one object mix up with those of another, as for example, when someone thinks akasha (the sky) curves like a bowl. This happens only when the person does not know the correct meaning of the word, in this case, of ‘akasha’. The meaning of a word, in its nature, ‘as it is’, is yathartha. An adhyasa of both types leads to a corrupted meaning- ayathartha.
How are words and knowledge connected? Knowledge is associated with knowing the words for objects. That is because, in the cognitive act of perception, an object becomes perceived as ‘this’ (its name). There are two kinds of knowledge: a) the identity of the object and b) the nature of the object. Even if one knows the identity of the object denoted by a word, if he does not know the nature of the object, we say that he does not know the object. One may point to an apple correctly but if he says that apples are intrinsically bitter, such knowledge is flawed.
Words reside in conscious beings. The capacity of a word to signify an object in the luminescence of consciousness is its ‘power’ or ‘shakti’. The nature of an object denoted by a word is dependent on the object itself in its nature ‘as it is’. The only mechanism by which a word may appear to denote something else is due to the cognitive operation of mind and intellect through the prism of avidya. The flaw of a word deflected from its object is through the superimposition of attributes that do not belong to the nature of the object. Avidya relates only to jivas. In other words, when there is paurusheyatva, there is potential for a flaw to arise in a word. In an Apaurusheya Reality, there is no potential for a flaw to arise. Scriptures are in the form of sentences. But whether words or sentences, it is knowledge of word meanings. The locus of the flaw is an avidya-ridden conscious being and not the words or sentences themselves.
FAULTLESS TRANSMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE
A word is a sound-form that points to an object and carries its meaning. But a word is an object too because it is a perceived thing. There are words that point to objects in the world, and there are words that point to words. The word ‘cow’ points to a cow; the word ‘word’ points to the word itself. The word ‘Veda’ points to a string of words in a definite order and not to objects in the world. The meanings constitute its subject matter; they constitute the knowledge contained in the Vedas.
In general, knowledge transmits through the process of teaching and learning. Knowledge transmission depends on many factors for its success: the excellence of the teacher, the capabilities of the students, and many other situational factors. Recognizing this fact, the Vedic method of transmission of knowledge is on an entirely different principle. In science, the means adopted to ensure a reasonable degree of insulation against errors of transmission is its openness to the public domain and to peer-review. But for subjects that speak of things beyond the reach of the senses, and which are obtainable only by the rarest of the rare in this world, critiques from the public domain hardly provide insulation against the knowledge being free of errors. Even if a rare person were to obtain such knowledge, who would be there to ascertain that the knowledge of the person is error-free?
The chain starting from the manifestation of the eternal scripture in the mundane world to its continuing transmission in the world would have to be flawless. If instead of relying on the fidelity of the knowledge transmitted to the students, we were to simply record the speech of the teacher we would have achieved our purpose. Irrespective of whether the students have grasped the knowledge taught to them or not, the recording would encapsulate the knowledge because those words in the recording are the carriers of meanings. The knowledge of the subject preserved in the recording would be available to anyone in the future. Vedic method of transmission of knowledge depends on the faithful transmission of the vehicle that carries knowledge – the Word. Now it becomes important to preserve the purity of the Vehicle.
PRESERVING THE PURITY OF THE VEDAS
The six vidyas called Vedangas accompany the study of Vedas. These are Siksha (Phonetics), Kalpa (Ritual), Vyakarana (Grammar), Nirukta (Etymology and Lexicology), Chanda (Prosody), and Jyotisha (Astrology and Astronomy). Two of these vidyas, Siksha (Phonetics) and Chanda (Prosody) are specifically meant to preserve the purity of the Vedas.
1. Siksha
Siksha, or Vedic Phonetics, is considered to be the most important vidya among the six Vedangas. It lays down the rules of phonetics and fixes precisely the method of pronunciation of the Vedas. The pronunciation is important because a small inflection in pronunciation can sometimes alter the meanings of the sentences. Siksha contains many methods to preserve the absolute purity of the word. They are known as Vaakya, Pada, Krama, Jata, Maala, Sikha, Rekha, Danda, Ratha, Ghana, etc. These methods are something like the error detection and correction algorithms used in modern messaging systems. They involve reciting each mantra in various patterns as specified by the methods, such as reciting it backward and forwards, breaking down the sentence into individual words, and reciting them in various combinations with the order of the words arranged in different patterns, etc. It takes 10 years for a student in the Vedic Pathashala to get the title of Ghanapati, one who can recite the Vedas correctly.
2. Chanda
Chanda is Prosody or Metrical Composition. It deals with the metrical and rhythmic aspects of chanting the Vedas. Whereas Siksha deals with the phonemes contained in the mantras, Chanda specifies the parameters for these phonemes, or phonetic pronunciations, to fall in place as poetry in metrical compositions. Chanda is a form of poetry and the term ‘Chanda‘ refers to the Veda itself as providing it with a distinction that differentiates it from ordinary Sanskrit. Chanda or meter provides the rhythm to the mantra. The rhythm also becomes an error-correction mechanism because a single mistake in pronunciation or intonation can break the rhythm of the poetry. Some of the meters which appear in the Vedas are Gayatri, Ushnik, Anushtup, Brihati, Pankti, Trishtup, Jagati, etc. As in the case of Siksha, Chanda too comes from the Vedas themselves. The Rishi who gave Chanda Sutras to the world is Pingala. Together, the two vidyas Siksha and Chanda ensure the purity of the Vedas. Thus, a Scripture that is Apaurusheya (first mark) and transmitted through a method that preserves the Purity of the Word (second mark) may qualify as flawless among all the scriptures found in the world.
FAULTLESSNESS: IS TRANSMISSION IN THE ENTIRETY NECESSARY?
Transmission has a purpose. The fundamental point is that the flaw in the transmission is determined by the purpose of the transmission. What is the purpose of transmitting the apaurusheya scripture? In modern messaging systems, we speak about information regarding particulars. In the scriptures, it is about knowledge regarding tattvas or universal principles. The one is related to information. The other is related to knowledge. So, given this nature of words, and given that the scriptures speak of universal principles, the importance of a transmission depends on the faithful transmission of the sentences that have these universal principles and not on the transmission of all the sentences that detail these universal principles in terms of particulars.
There are three aspects of the Vedas. Firstly, the sentences in scripture that contain the universal principles as their meanings are few. Secondly, the scriptures contain sentences that speak of the same principle from different approaches. For example, the Mandukya Upanishad speaks of the Supreme Truth by approaching it from the three states to the Fourth. There are sections in the Brahadaranyaka and Chandogya Upanishads that speak of the same Truth by approaching it from the non-difference of the effect from its material cause. Thirdly, the scriptures contain repetitions of the same Universal Principles in many different places in the scriptures.
The Vedas have an in-built mechanism to safeguard the transmission of the knowledge of the tattvas in the very body and structure of the scripture itself. There is no separate Vedanga to ensure complete transmission of the entirety of the Vedas unlike in the case of phonetic and tonal purity of the sound. Hence, for the transmission of the Apaurusheya Vedas, which transmit Knowledge of Universal Tattvas, the purpose is not dependent on the transmission of the entirety of the scripture.
THE QUESTION OF METHOD
The opposition to the Vedic tradition comes largely from those who espouse science. Unfortunately, a new system based entirely on modern science and European Renaissance ideas has replaced completely the traditional education. But it becomes vital for us to follow a method commensurate with Vedanta when we discuss Apaurusheyatva of the Vedas. When it comes to the acquisition of knowledge, ‘reason’ alone, a broad category, is an adequate tool. Science, for example, uses a specific reasoning method different from the reasoning methods used in philosophy. The central idea of science- physical causes alone can explain all things in nature, came from the Epicureans of Greece. Later, Francis Bacon (‘The Great Instauration’ and ‘Novum Organum’), Newton, and other scientists laid the foundation for the birth of science as we know it today.
In science, we begin with a proposition (a statement) that seeks to fit the facts of observed phenomena into a hypothesis. In doing so, the scientist uses reason to see that these facts fit logically into the meaning of the (propositional) statement. But science says further that this (propositional) statement must be physically verifiable. This is the key factor here. This principle of physical verifiability precludes the idea of there being any cause other than physical matter for the phenomena of the world. In contrast, there is no such constraint to philosophy by such ideas and its propositions have a different criterion of verifiability than conformance to physical verifiability.
It is necessary for us when discussing Vedanta, to consider the nature of the subject matter that we are dealing with. We are dealing here with a ‘Para Vidya’ in sharp contrast to every other science or discipline in the world grouped under the name of ‘apara vidya’. Science endeavors to throw light upon, among other things, how this universe originated and how life in the universe originated. Vedanta seeks to reveal a knowledge of a Truth by which billions and billions of cycles of creation and destruction are at once dissolved by an individual’s Self. When we seek to know the ‘truths’ revealed by science, we use elaborately constructed tools, but when it comes to the Supreme Knowledge of Vedanta, why do we become so blasé that we feel free to disregard the methods that it advocates?
THE TRAP OF MAYA
When we strive to obtain knowledge about an object, there are three factors involved in the process of obtaining knowledge: the subject, the object to be known, and the internal instrument by which the subject obtains knowledge of the object. In both Science and Western philosophy, the focus is entirely on knowing the object without regard to the nature of the internal instrument that we use to obtain knowledge.
In Vedanta, the situation is drastically different because it recognizes that avidya is the root cause of the jiva’s incapacity to obtain perfect knowledge. According to Advaita Vedanta, avidya influences the perception of the world. Mula-avidya, or the deep sleep that underlies the existence of a jiva, is avyakta or unmanifest. It is the darkness of sleep that one ‘sees’ when one is in deep sleep. It is the reason that when one wakes up from deep sleep, one says, ‘I knew nothing’. The ‘nothingness’ that one knew in deep sleep is the darkness that blocks the effulgence of the Self. By its essential nature, the Self is Self-effulgent with Consciousness. The deep sleep of the jiva obstructs the effulgence of the Self and presents the darkness of ‘nothing’. Even when a jiva wakes up, this sleep (bija-nidra) is present and everything that it perceives is through the veil of sleep. That is why when a man knows an object through perception, he still has the notion that he does not know it and builds theories to explain what the object is. But the object perceived is already known because pratyaksha, the valid means of knowledge for knowing the object, has revealed it.
The theories that one constructs to explain the object become superimpositions (adhyasa) on the object. In the words of Ludwig Wittgenstein, we look at the world through the nets of our theoretical constructs. Wittgenstein and his group in the field of Modern Analytical Philosophy tried to define a set of verifiability criteria for science. After striving for almost a decade, they abandoned the project. They recognized that the scientific propositions which form the initial working hypotheses of the scientists are already colored by the symbolic framework of science. Thus, was born the idea of ‘theory-ladenness of observation’. It is never possible for anyone to be completely free of theories when he or she looks at the world. Thus, the idea of our perceptions being colored by avidya is not a mere dogmatic assertion brought forth from the pages of Vedanta but a similar notion is indeed evident in the phenomenon of ‘theory-ladenness’. This then is the human predilection. The inner constitution of man is already colored by the darkness of avidya and it presents a matrix of circularity from which it is difficult to escape. To come back to the main point, the inner instrument of cognition needs to be free of defects if we are to obtain knowledge. There is no attempt either in science or in Western Philosophy to address this issue whereas, in traditional Indian Philosophy, it forms a major part of the effort to acquire knowledge.
THE MATRIX OF ACTION AND KNOWLEDGE
According to traditional Indian philosophies, the causal factors that give rise to inimical proclivities in the human mind and obstruct its strivings to obtain knowledge lie in the field of action. Even though the obtainment of knowledge is not dependent on action, action still plays a large part in the jiva’s struggle to attain knowledge. This is because it has a causal relation with the jiva’s condition which is the presence or absence of defects in the instruments of cognition. A jiva gets bound to ‘action’ only in the absence of Knowledge. This binding to action causes merits and demerits (from good and bad karmas) to arise. Unmeritorious actions lead to two things: (i) karma phala (fruits of past actions) in the form of suffering, and (ii) birth in a body that is suitable for the experience of the karma-phala. Bad karma, or unmeritorious action, leads to bodies possessing limitations and defects in the senses and instruments of cognition. In the presence of such defects in the instruments of cognition, knowledge cannot arise.
One obtains a defect-free instrument of cognition only through the performance of a set of actions that rectifies past defects and also prevents new defects. This two-fold set of actions to attain a defect-free condition results in chitta-shuddhi. In traditional Indian philosophy, this set of actions constitutes a life of ‘living by dharma’. In the pursuit of the four purusharthas known as kama, artha, dharma, and moksha, kama (pleasure) and artha (wealth and status) are acceptable but within the boundaries of dharma. It is only by living a life of dharma that a person goes towards the fourth purushartha, i.e., moksha. The human effort to obtain knowledge is thus a matrix involving both action and intellectual striving. With chitta-shuddhi, the effort at obtaining knowledge begins to bear fruit and the meanings of the scriptural statements begin to make sense. This is the stage of ‘adhikaara‘ when the person enters into the realm of epiphanic insight.
In Advaita Vedanta, the term ‘adhikaara’ is synonymous with the four qualifications comprising viveka (discrimination), vairagya (dispassion), sad-sampatti (six virtues), and mumukshutva (intense desire to attain liberation). Sri Shankaracharya categorically states that brahma-jignasa bears fruit only in the presence of the four qualifications. One who leads such a life that first establishes a pure mind through action and then a foundation to obtain Supreme knowledge is an Arya. Arya Dharma wholly directs to the ultimate goal of attaining the Supreme Knowledge even in those stages of a man’s life when the desire for kama and artha prevail in the heart. In Science and Western Philosophy, the pursuit of knowledge is an isolated activity. There is no recognition of the fundamental fact that the internal instrument for obtaining knowledge needs to be in a suitable condition. There are a few philosophies that recognize the imperative for action in the process of obtaining knowledge, such as those of Socrates and the Stoics, and in more recent times, the philosophy of Spinoza.
In Indian Philosophy, the pursuit of knowledge forms the central thread. Dharma has two forms known as pravritti and nivritti, the first pertaining to devotion to rightful action (karma-nishta) that seeks to make the condition suitable for knowledge to arise; and the second pertaining to devotion to knowledge (jnana-nishta) wherein the adhikari’s striving for knowledge bears fruit in the form of Supreme Knowledge. In the contemporary world, there exists a dichotomy between a body of knowledge called science in which the striving for knowledge is an isolated activity and a traditional body of knowledge in which the striving for knowledge forms an integral part of every sphere of human activity. In Vedanta, there is no such thing as a beginning to the process of acquiring knowledge. A jiva picks up from where he left off in a previous life and proceeds from there towards the goal.
PART 2
VEDANTA – SAMANVAYA AND AVIRODHA
Much of the confusion that prevails in contemporary discussions on Vedanta arises from ignoring this two-fold dimension (pravritti and nivritti) for the Supreme Knowledge. Consequently, it has become common practice for participants in a debate to ask for the truths of the Vedas through arguments and proofs. But the pramana called Veda does not exist to show the proof to one who has no capacity to see the truth. The sun shines by its own nature and reveals the world in its sunlight. It is not the deficiency of the sun or of the sunlight if a blind man cannot see the world. That is why, in contradistinction to the buddhi (intellect) of an ordinary man, the intellect of an adhikaari for knowledge is ‘shuddha buddhi’ (pure intellect). It is for such a person that the Veda serves as a pramana to reveal the Supreme Truth.
The Vedas are pramanas for two categories of people: (i) the adhikaaris who have attained the four qualifications, and (ii) those who walk in the path of Vedic pravritti dharma where they discipline the mind. Adhikaara are qualifications that pertain to the inner constitution of the soul. Secondly, adhikaara is not something that always surfaces as an irruption at a single point in time. For one who has led perfect lives in many births, it may suddenly irrupt with all the four qualifications manifested to the fullest degree. Such a man is an uttama-adhikaari and he needs to hear the Mahavakya only once to see the meanings of the Vedic sentences. But for many other adhikaaris, the four qualifications may manifest to varying degrees and such people would need to strive hard. This striving to see the meaning of the Vedas (Vedartha) is a process of reconciliation of the diverse Vedic sentences to reveal that Single Vision in which they fall in place effortlessly. Such a reconciliation of Vedic sentences is Samanvaya.
Samanvaya is meant for the adhikaaris and for those people who study the Vedas as part of their duties. It finds its place in a debate (vada) only between two opponents both of whom abide by the common tenet that the Veda is pramana. But when the debate is between two opponents wherein one of them does not believe the Veda to be pramana, then the debate does not take the form of Samanvaya, but takes the form of Avirodha. The latter is tarka (discussion) to ensure that there is no virodha (opposition) to the vision obtained by samanvaya (reconciliation). There is no attempt in such debates to demonstrate the truth of the Vedas to the opponents.
TRADITIONAL INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ARE DARSHANAS, NOT SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHIES
Modern authors writing on Indian Philosophy often refer to it as ‘speculative philosophy’. Unlike in science, wherein the scientific proposition has a criterion of physical verifiability, philosophy in the West had a different criterion. It is for this reason that philosophy earned a notoriously bad name in the early years of the twentieth century when the entire field of metaphysics became ‘nonsense’. The ‘attack’ against philosophy came from the ‘Analytical Philosophers’. The propositions are factually meaningful only if they are empirically verifiable or if they derive out of terms already defined (tautologous). Hence, in the absence of both, metaphysical statements are meaningless. Since metaphysics, philosophy, ethics, religion, and aesthetics are all of this nature, the only task that remains for philosophy is that of clarification and analysis. They concluded that the propositions of philosophy are linguistic, not factual, and philosophy was a department of logic. Based on such assertions, Analytical Philosophy sought to sweep aside two millennia of lofty human thought into the dustbin of ‘emotive thinking’.
It is not hard to see where this line of thinking comes from. Western philosophy had failed to provide a sound basis for epistemology. Unlike the Indian Darshanas, most of the Western philosophy was largely speculative in origin and the propositions of philosophy were often grand edifices built on the caprices of thought. Western philosophy became a complex maze of verbiage that ultimately led to the discrediting of everything metaphysical – and of philosophy herself.
In traditional Indian Philosophy, assertions about the objects of the world are grounded either in perception or in inference. Hence, there is no scope for these assertions to stray into speculative thought. If they do stray, it is only due to the incorrect application of the pramanas and not due to the nature of the philosophy itself. And when it comes to assertions about things that lie beyond the range of the senses, the assertions are grounded in Scriptural sentences and in inferences that depend entirely on these scriptural sentences. If they do stray here too, it is again due to an incorrect understanding of the scriptural sentences or the inferences drawn from them. There is a lot of misconception about Indian Philosophy that comes from modern authors, both Indian as well as Western.
Traditional Indian Philosophies are Darshanas. A darshana is not something derived from basic principles to finally arrive at a conclusion. A Darshana is a Single Vision in which all its elements including epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, the practice, and the fruits of sadhana are like various organs that form a single integral whole. Each of the traditional philosophies or darshanas is eternal and is part of the Vedic structure. That is why they constitute one of the fourteen branches of learning (vidhyasthanas) known as Chaturdasa Vidyas.
THE PRAMANAS AND THE NATURE OF THE PRAMEYAS
All traditional darshanas begin with an explanation of the pramanas. A pramana is a means of obtaining knowledge about an object. There are three basic pramanas in traditional Indian Philosophies. They are Agama (Scripture), pratyaksha (perception), and anumana (inference). The object known by means of a pramana is the prameya. The knowledge of the object is prama. Knowledge of an object is not a distinct entity that stands between the subject and the object but a qualification of the subject, the knower.
Now, there is a distinct mark of the prameya, or object, in traditional Indian philosophies that is missing in Science and Western philosophy. This mark is the mark of ‘being seen’ or the mark of ‘knowableness’. This point is so vital that if we fail to recognize it, it is likely to lead us into such a position that we would not be speaking Indian Philosophy at all. The mark of ‘being seen’ is a mark of prakriti. In Purva Mimamsa, Uttara Mimamsa (Vedanta), Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, and Yoga, the prameya is ‘the seen’ as distinct from the seer. In Navya-Nyaya, after defining the seven kinds of padarthas (word-objects) – substance, quality, action, universal, particular, inherence, and non-existence – it states that the common feature of all these seven categories is ‘knowableness’. This feature of objects being ‘the seen’ finds expression in the philosophical tenet that there is a contact between the seer and the seen object- sannikrishna. The form that the (reflected) consciousness of the seer assumes in seeing the object is ‘vritti’. Thus, the entire world, directly seen ‘as it is’ has no extraneous mediating factor between the seer and the seen.
What is the ‘nature of the world’ as it appears through the theories of science? First of all, there is no distinct thing in science called ‘the seer’. Secondly, science postulates an elaborate mechanism by which perceptions of objects occur. Accordingly, signals from the object arrive at the sensory organs of the body, these signals then transform into electro-neural signals which various sensory channels carry by to the brain, and then there is the processing of signals to present outputs in the form of images of the objects in the world. Thus, by the very nature of this postulated mechanism, the things seen are of the nature of images and are not the objects themselves.
We have no means by which we may verify that these images actually possess the same forms as the forms of objects in the world. In other words, every attempt to see them brings to us images rather than the object as it is. Therefore, the theory presents a host of conundrums if we should insist that the images, we see, are the real objects that exist in the world. Therefore, those who hold on to such a belief, i.e., the belief that what we see is the real world, are Naïve Realists. And the philosophy that holds the perceived world to be the real world is ‘Naïve Realism’.
Then there are those philosophers who, instead of asking the question, ‘By what means may we know that the images we see have actual likenesses to real objects in the world?’, ask the question, ‘By what means may we know that there are objects in the world at all?’ And they conclude that these images are nothing more than productions of the mind, mere ideas, or ideations of the mind. The crux of their arguments is that there can be no means to know whether there are real objects in the world given that the things we experience arise in our minds and are contained in the mind. This is a philosophical position termed as ‘Idealism’.
There are many variants of idealism, from the kind of Idealism first proposed in the West by Berkeley to the later variants known as Phenomenology and Existentialism, but they all fit into the broad category called ‘Idealism’ as they hold the world to be born out of subjective ideations and belief systems. The terms ‘Naïve Realism’ and ‘Idealism’ are fine when used to refer to certain philosophies of the West. But it is amusing to see many contemporary writers labeling Nyaya as a kind of ‘Naïve Realism’ or ‘Advaita’ as a kind of ‘Idealism’. Sri Sarvapelli Radhakrishnan, in his book ‘History of Indian Philosophy’, paints a picture of Advaita as a kind of Idealism. So does Dasgupta in his History of Indian Philosophies. And as far as the scholars of the West are concerned, it has become more a rule than an exception for viewing Advaita through the lens of Idealism. Similarly, many scholars of the West who write books on Nyaya say that Nyaya’s conception of the world is that of ‘Naïve Realism’.
Advaita is not Idealism because it negates both the mind and the world. And it says at the same time, the mind and the world are different. Advaita does not negate only the world and leaves aside the mind to say that the world is ‘mind’. There are twenty-four tattvas defined in Vedanta and only four of them are internal-instruments (antah-karanas comprising ego, chitta, intellect, and mind) whereas the rest are external objects. The attributes of the internal instruments cannot transfer to the objects of the world. The world is not ‘mind’. The objects of the mind, i.e., ideas and thought, have the characteristic of being determined by the individual’s will whereas the objects of the world do not have the characteristic of being so determined. One cannot cook food by merely thinking about the food. In Advaita, the relations between words and objects are eternal, and each word denotes a specific kind of object with specific attributes. Without understanding this basic tenet of Advaita, it is wrong on the part of those authors to label Advaita as Idealism and thereby confuse the world by writing books on the subject.
And with regards to those scholars who term Nyaya as Naïve Realism, the entire dichotomy between ‘images seen in perception’ and ‘unknowable objects out there in the world’ is a creation of an illogical and incoherent hypothesis that perception takes place through the mediating mechanism of the sensory network and the brain. The notion of Naïve Realism is a caricature of reality that has no bearing on Nyaya or Vedanta. The Nyaya (and Vedanta) theory of perception is based on the principle of contact between the subject and object in which there is no chance of the reality of the world becoming ‘naïve’. Nor is there in them a chance of the world becoming something else than the seen. Therefore, the application of the term ‘Naïve Realism’ to Nyaya betrays a lack of knowledge of Nyaya.
According to traditional Indian philosophies, the object known through a pramana is neither a mere presentation of something else that may be the real object (as in science) nor is it reducible to something lesser than what it presents itself to be (such as a mere idea of the mind). An object is that which stands to consciousness in the cognitive act of perception. The world in Indian Philosophy is not the world of Naïve Realism nor is it the ideated world of Idealism. If we must find a name for it, it may be the world of Direct Realism – a world as it presents itself directly to Consciousness.
THE LOST ARK OF THE CATEGORIES
According to Nyaya Shastra, the prameyas, or objects of knowledge, are of seven kinds. These are dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma (action), samanya (universal), vishesha (particular), samavaya (inherence), and abhava (non-existence). A study of scholastic philosophy included a study of such objects. But today, both in the East and in the West, there is an effacement of such ideas. Vedanta accepts the categories of Nyaya except for the category called ‘inherence’.
Scientists have discarded the idea of ‘substance’ after looking for it for many decades. However, one cannot find ‘substance’ even after looking for it for a million years. It appears in the original moment of cognition by an apperception that recognizes substance as the grounding factor of the objects we perceive in the world. Substance, in its capacity as pure substance, is never naked without attributes. And neither do we perceive attributes merely. That ‘something’ which the attributes describe (as the nature of the existing thing) is substance. The intrinsic characteristic of a substance is ‘existence’. And because a substance is an existing thing with various attributes, it is a unity that binds these various attributes into one single unitary existing thing.
The case with universals is similar. One cannot find universals by looking for them. Anything one can look at, think of, or conceive is a ‘particular’. Universals do not exist in the world. They do not exist in thought. They are not spatio-temporal things. Universals are meanings that exist in the Self and which form the basis of sakshi-pramana in the act of recognition (pratyabhijna). In the West, there has been a two-thousand-year war between the Realists (Platonists) and the Nominalists over the question of the existence of universals. Thaeatetus of Plato answers it – universals are ‘stamps of truth in Being’. The ‘ideal red’ or the ‘ideal circle’ of Plato is not something found by itself in the world. The world in Plato is a world of shadows, and the ideal world is elsewhere – it is the stamp of truth in the Numinous Ground of Being.
These symbols – substance, attributes, universals, particulars, etc. – were used to evoke meanings in the minds of the people of Europe until the end of the medieval era. The Ark of the Categories passed on from generation to generation by the traditions of scholastic philosophy, but it disappeared in the post-Descartian period when Science and British Empiricism brought about a new age. And in India, the great traditions of Nyaya Shastra suffered when the children of Aryavarta left the institutions of a timeless Gurukula system to seek knowledge from an education system brought to them by Macaulay. A soul that looks at the world through virginal eyes, unclothed by the webs of extraneous theories, sees the categories. Socrates had said that a thing is red in color for no other reason except for the participation of ‘ideal redness’ in the thing. This is the fundamental ground on which logic stands – that a thing is what it is due to itself and not on account of another.
The categories are the fundamental stuff – the ancient and timeless Logos – which makes the universe. Everything that we see around us is nama rupa (name and form). Name and form are synonymous with word and object, and the term ‘padartha’ derives from the two words – pada (word) and artha (object). Padarthas are the building blocks that go into the foundational structure of the universe, made of name and form. The padarthas are to be known by turning our attention to the acts of cognition of the objects rather than by the construction of theories built on the unexamined structure of the elements that lie in the acts of cognition. These padarthas are constituents of the vritti when the mind and senses conform to the form of the object; one cannot find them by looking for them outside after the vritti forms. The act of looking makes the senses and mind conform to different kinds of objects through different kinds of vrittis. And this brings us to a fundamental difference between science and Indian Traditional Philosophy.
Indian traditional philosophy strives to reveal the nature of objects. Science seeks to construct theories to explain the nature of objects. The former grounds in revealing; the latter in theory construction. The difference between the two stems from a fundamental difference in their attitudes toward knowledge. In Indian traditional philosophies, one seeks knowledge from within. In science, one seeks knowledge from outside. There exists an almost unbridgeable gulf between contemporary science and traditional Indian philosophies. Hence, we should follow the method advocated by the Vedic tradition, or at least abide by some minimum set of guidelines having common ground with the traditional epistemologies, when we discuss topics related to Vedanta.
THE TRADITIONAL PROOF
There are two kinds of proof offered in the Vedic tradition to show that the Vedas are apaurusheya. One is a philosophical proof based on Mimamsa. The tradition also offers an alternate proof that does not depend on knowledge of Mimamsa. The strength of the proof lies in this very fact that it does not rely on evidence that comes from the Vedas, and hence it avoids circularity of reasoning. At first sight, the proof may not appear to be a proof at all: it is simply the fact that there happens to be an unbroken tradition that holds the Vedas to be unauthored. But despite its seeming naivety, it is an incontrovertible proof. Of course, whether a scripture is paurusheya or apaurusheya would make no sense to a person who does not believe in scriptures.
The Vedas were once the heart of a living tradition, governing every aspect of human life and infusing it with a sense of inspiration and sublimity. There is a misconception among some people that the Vedas are unauthored because they are not known to have had any human author. The expression ‘not known’ indicates a failure to know. The tradition says that the Vedas are known to have no human author. The former indicates a failure to know the author, whereas the latter asserts knowledge about its unauthoredness.
Authoredness, by its nature, is perceptible to the senses. Unauthoredness, by its nature, is not perceptible to the senses. Therefore, perception is the wrong means of knowledge (pramana) to know about unauthoredness. It has to be known by some other means. In order to appreciate the distinction mentioned above, we may consider an analogous case: that of abhava (non-existence). Merely not perceiving an object does not indicate its nonexistence, because the object may actually be existent and we may have failed to perceive its existence. There is thus a separate pramana in Advaita Vedanta called ‘anupalabdi’ for ascertaining the non-existence of an object. The correct articulation of the traditional position is that the unauthoredness of Vedas is an object of knowledge and not an absence of knowledge of its author.
DIVERSE STRANDS OF THE THEME OF UNAUTHOREDNESS
- Central Core of the Tradition
- Dual-Categorization of Language
- Extensiveness of the Tradition
- The Field of Action: Preservation of Sound
The Central Core Of The Tradition
There are three aspects to the central core of the timeless tradition that holds the Vedas to be unauthored.
1. Unbrokenness of the tradition
There is an unbroken tradition from the past that holds the Vedas to be unauthored by humans. There has been no point in history when anyone has claimed authorship of the Vedas. On the contrary, every seer, every great person, has only confirmed their unauthoredness.
2. Etymology of the word ‘rishi’
Tradition says that the Apaurusheya Vedas irrupted into the mundane world at two stages: (i) at the stage of creation when Ishvara revealed it to Brahma; and (ii) during the early stages after creation, in Krita yuga and Treta yuga, when the Rishis saw it during their tapas. Now, as regards the manifestation through the rishis, the root of the word ‘rishi’ indicates the manner of its manifestation. The Vedanga related to Etymology is Nirukta. ‘Rishi’ comes from ‘being a seer’: ‘rishi darshanath’. So, the very word ‘rishi’ has its origin in the event of ‘seeing’, of being a drshta (seer). And at both points of irruption, i.e., during creation as well as post-creation, they had no human author because, firstly, Ishvara, who revealed them, is not human and, secondly, the rishis who gave them to the world saw them and did not create them.
3. Existence of multiple rishis for the same mantra (the immune system)
Every Vedic mantra is associated with three things: a rishi (the seer of the mantra), a devata (the god who presides over the mantra), and a chanda (the meter of its chanting). The Vedas contain many mantras, or even entire suktas, revealed to multiple rishis—from two to a thousand. The multiplicity of rishis for the same mantras forms the core immune system that guards the tradition of unauthoredness against counter-claims. It is like a Copyright for unauthoredness that prevents anyone from claiming authorship of the mantras. The Vedic mantras are the common property of the universe and none, neither a mortal nor a god, can claim their authorship.
Dual-Categorization Of Language
The entire texture and flavor of our worldview are determined by the language we use. The apaurusheyatva of the Vedas is present in this most basic seat of learning and was an element of culture permeating the consciousness of the entire populace. The idea of apaurusheyatva of the Vedas was the prime factor due to which language itself was categorized into two types: the language of the Vedas (Vaidika) and the language of mortals (laukika). The two primary vidyas related to language- Vyakarana (Grammar) and Nirukta (Etymology) had as their fundamental ground the apaurusheyatva of the Vedas.
Grammar (Vyakarana)
The refinement of a language is determined by the perfection of its grammar. No other language has a grammar as perfect or as refined as that of Sanskrit, as acknowledged by scholars across time and space. In Panini’s Ashtadhyayi, the base work of grammar, its first sutra contains the notion of dual categorization of words: “atha sabdanusasanam“.
Patanjali’s Bhashya explains this as: Now (follows) the instructions of words. The word ‘atha’ indicates the commencement of the topic. The action of instruction has for its object, ‘the words’ of the laukika and the Vaidika. There, the laukika are: cow, horse, man, elephant, beast, Brahmin, and so forth. There, the Vaidika are – sanno devir abhistaye (may the shining good be for the sacrifices (A.V.1.1.6)); ise tvoraje tva (I cut thee for libation and strength (Y.V.1.1.1)); agnim ile purohitam (I adore Agni, the leader (R.V.1.1.1); Agna ayahi vitaye ((Oh Agnim, may thou come for drinking the clarified butter (S.V.1.1.1). In giving the example of laukika words, words have a separate and random mention. But in giving the example of Vaidika words, the definite order in which they occur is extremely crucial, and it is for that reason that the illustrations of Vaidika words are in the form of sentences in which they occur.
Etymology (Nirukta)
In Nirukta, the study of Etymology, the origin of every word is ultimately traced to Vedic Sanskrit. Indeed, the Nirukta begins with a list of Vedic words called the Nighantu. ‘Having been repeatedly gathered together from Vedic hymns, they have been handed down by tradition.’ (Nirukta.1.1). The Nirukta also contains a direct reference to the apaurusheyatva of the Vedas. It mentions the Vedas as seen (through direct insight by seers) and not as something created or authored. Thus, the idea of the Vedas being apaurusheya is in the most basic and primary seats of traditional learning.
Extensiveness Of The Tradition
The idea of apaurusheyatva of the Vedas has pervaded all the six traditional schools, starting from their original texts themselves. It also extended to other branches of learning too.
Purva Mimamsa / Uttara Mimamsa
Jaimini Purva Mimamsa Sutras (1.5, 1.27. 1.30, 1.31) says that there is an eternal connection between the word and its meaning. The objection that the Vedas have a human origin is groundless. The names mentioned are on account of the person explaining them. The different parts of the Vedas are named after those sages in their honor. The names of persons used in the Vedas are common nouns and not proper nouns. The person bore the names subsequently (in the cycles of creation). So, this argument of the objector does not detract from the eternality of the Vedas. Similarly, Vedanta Sutras (1.28, 1.29, 1.30) say: the universe arises from this (i.e., from Vedic words), which direct revelation and inference prove. This very fact follows the eternality of the Vedas. And there is no contradiction, since similar names and forms repeat even in the revolution of the world cycles, as is known from the Vedas and Smriti.
Sankhya / Yoga
Samkhya darshana too considers the Vedas to be apaurusheya. Sankhya Karika (Sutras 4 & 5 as elucidated by Bhashya of Vachaspati Misra): …Verbal Testimony is the statement of trustworthy persons and the Vedas. Verbal testimony is self-authoritative; it is always right as it is authored by the words of the Vedas, not authored by any human being and therefore free from all defects. It is for this same reason that the knowledge derived from smrti, itihasa, and purana is also right because they have the Vedas as their source. Yoga follows all the basic tenets of Samkhya except for some subtle differences. While Samkhya is silent with regard to Ishwara, Yoga considers Ishwara to be a special Purusha equipped with the powers of creation, sustenance, and destruction of the universe.
Nyaya / Vaisesika
The expression ‘apaurusheyatva of the Vedas’ has a slightly different connotation than in the other traditional darshanas. In Nyaya, the term ‘apaurusheyatva’ means ‘having no human author’. It does not indicate the second qualification, ‘eternality’, as it does in Mimamsa. Nyaya Kusumanjali of Udayanacharya shows the correct position of Nyaya with regard to the Vedas: The right knowledge caused by testimony is one produced by a quality in the speaker, viz., his knowledge of the exact meaning of the words used; hence, proving the existence of God, as He must be the subject of such a quality in the case of the Veda. Thus, there is no human authorship ascribed to the Vedas in Nyaya-Vaisesika either.
The Other Vidyas
The idea of apaurusheyatva of the Vedas exists in the other two Upangas (Purana and Dharma Shastra) too. There are eighteen major puranas and as many subsidiary puranas. The accounts of creation mention that Brahma creates the universe through tapah on the Vedic words, showing that the Veda (or Vedic words) predates creation. Bhagavata Purana, for example, says: “The Lord (Vishnu) said: O Brahma who holds the Vedas latent in you! I am highly pleased by your long and concentrated meditation for enlightenment on the work of creation. (Bh.Ch.9.19)”
The class of texts known as the Dharma Shastra is Smriti. Though the word ‘Smriti’ often refers to a broad class of literature, including the Puranas and Itihasas, it strictly refers to the Dharma Shastra alone. “By the Sruti is meant the Veda, and by Smriti the Dharma Shastras: these two must not be called into question in any matter, since from these two the sacred law shone forth.” (MS.II.10) The Manu Smriti refers to the Veda as the ‘eternal Veda’ and also mentions that the names of created beings were according to the words of the (eternal) Veda.
The diverse traditional branches of learning sufficiently show that the idea has permeated into the entire fabric of Vedic culture. This phenomenon should have been common knowledge to us – to at least those of us who are born in this culture, but unfortunately, modern education seems to have severed us from our roots.
The Field Of Action: Preservation Of Sound
The preservation of Sound (the Vedic hymns) in its phonetic and metrical purity is directly based on the special significance of the Vedas as Sruti – the Eternal Sound. The very idea of safeguarding it as a vehicle that carries the Supreme Knowledge is grounded in the Vedas as being uncreated, unauthored, perfect, and faultless. What other reason can make an entire civilization devise its education system to provide extensive training to guard the purity of the Vedic sound against being corrupted? What other reason can make so many people in a society or a civilization undertake such onerous tasks as learning to pronounce the Vedas for 10 years or 15 years to protect its purity? And we are not speaking here of a small segment of society, but of a large section of the population stretching across the length and breadth of Bharatvarsha.
PART 3
NYAYA AND MIMAMSA – UNCREATEDNESS AND THE PREDICATION OF EXISTENCE
Both schools believe that the Vedas have no human author. However, as a subtle difference, while Mimamsa believes the Vedas to be eternal, Nyaya holds them to be non-eternal. This difference arises essentially from the difference in the meaning of the term ‘existence’ as seen by the two schools. Mimamsa is based on satkaryavada (on the pre-existence of the effect in the cause) while Nyaya is based on asatkaryavada (on the prior non-existence of the effect). Mimamsa is Vedic Vakhyarthavidya and its object is Brahman and the Eternal Law that exists in the Nature of Brahman. Its specific aim is the revelation of Vedic sentences. Nyaya is pramana-vidya based on normal language, and its aim is to reveal the nature of the pramanas and the nature of word meanings in accordance with these pramanas.
Therefore, Mimamsa and Nyaya, being based on Vedic and ordinary languages, respectively, have a natural opposition between them. In Nyaya, a word is non-eternal because it has a beginning and an end. Mimamsa would not only say that the Vedas are eternal but would also be sympathetic to Nyaya, which by the very nature of its darshana, bound as it is by ordinary language, has to say that the Vedas are non-eternal.
COHERENCY AND THE ONUS OF PROOF
There exists an unbroken tradition coherent with the conception of the Vedas as the ‘seen’ and not authored. The idea of apaurusheyatva of the eternal Vedas exists in all the branches of traditional learning across a vast geographical stretch of land. Based on this coherence of the beginningless tradition, it stands established that the Vedas are eternal and beginningless. One may object by saying that a single dissonant element can rupture this coherency. However, what is the nature of this single element disproving the coherence? Is it a claim of a historical event of a person claiming to be the author of the Vedas? If so, it is the veracity of the claim of a single claimant and not the veracity of the many that need questioning. There is yet to be such a claim too.
If the disrupting element is something other than a historical event, then the objection is groundless. When beginningless is established by the existence of the tradition and by the coherency of the various elements of the tradition, the onus is on the claimant to prove a counterclaim. The existence of the word ‘rishi’, the existence of mention of multiple rishis for the same mantras and suktas, the existence of mention of the apaurusheyatva of the Vedas in grammar, in etymology, in all the traditional philosophies, in the dharmashastras, in the puranas, are cognized facts. The onus is clearly on the person to prove how these cognized elements have manifested.
One might say that the Charavakas, the Buddhists, and the Jainas disagreed with the tradition, so the coherency does break. However, disagreement is not a condition that breaks the coherency; there must be perceptible facts that contradict the coherency. For if mere disagreement is the ground for falsification of a thesis, every thesis in the world will stand disproved. Those who disagree will need to provide perceptible facts like showing: the beginning of the tradition, the word ‘rishi’ has a different origin, and the nonexistence of statements holding the Vedas to be apaurusheya in the various texts. Moreover, the tradition has always stood on multiple people dependent on an independent scripture (Veda), unlike in the case of other scriptures that have had human origins and were dependent on the authors. On the contrary, in the case of the Vedas, there has been no point in time when the scripture has been dependent on a single person. The onus of proof of a contrary thesis to explain the perceptible and coherent facts has always been with the one who disagrees with the tradition. And no one, so far, has provided such contrary proof. So, the beginningless of the tradition stands established as it has stood for all time.
THE LAW OF PARSIMONY
One may now object that the entire phenomenon of the existence of the beginningless tradition might have had a historical origin during the development of human thought. The reply would be that the law of parsimony (first mentioned by the sage Gautama) would demand that we go by the tradition rather than by any such historical explanation. For any such historical explanation would necessarily have to falsify the various elements presented here and any attempt to falsify these elements on such a large scale would amount to stating that the tradition is a grand conspiracy concocted by some people who had somehow managed to get these elements into the various texts.
They, moreover, managed it on such a large scale as to implant these elements across a large geographical stretch of land over a time period spanning into many eras or eons. Finally, these conspirators somehow instituted the universal practice of learning the chanting of the Vedas under the belief that it is unauthored and faultless. The onus is again on the counter claimant to explain credibly how such a large conspiracy was possible in incorporating the notion into so many diverse texts and in instituting practices that no one under ordinary circumstances would be willing to adhere to. The entire proposition is enormously cumbersome and far-fetched and has no ground to stand on.
The objector may now say that it may not be a conspiracy but a kind of hallucination arising in the minds of these people due to some peculiar condition of the human mind. The reply is that whether a thing is a hallucination or not is determined using the pramanas and not by mere assertions. The truth of a statement asserting a thing is bound by the nature of the thing itself- that, which it is. The free flight of imagination, which is not so bound to the truth, or to the nature of the thing, is infinite and many. If all these coherent elements of the tradition are the products of hallucination, then, the onus is to show how the coherency has come about. Hallucination is not bound by truth or by any pramana and is likely to be varied and diverse. But if one should accept that coherency is a mark of truth, then it would be corroborative with the statement: the actual existence of a beginningless tradition combined with the coherency of the various elements in the tradition points to the beginninglessness of the tradition of handing down the Vedas from teacher to student in all eras and in all cycles of creation.
The pramanas themselves may be based on mere conditions of the mind, the objector might say. In such a case, the assertion that the tradition is based on a hallucination is also liable to be based on a hallucination. One who does not accept the pramanas and says that they are based on hallucination has no ground to make any kind of assertion, as it denies all grounds for assertions of truth and means of acquiring knowledge.
Thus, from the fact that: there exists a beginningless tradition of the Vedas being handed down; the tradition forms a tightly coupled coherent system in which one cannot deny a single element without throwing the onus of proof on to the denier; and any alternate hypothesis needs rejection on the law of parsimony, the Vedas are eternal, beginningless, and Apaurusheya.
THE FORMAL PROOF
The pramana for establishing the unauthoredness of the Vedas is anupalabdhi- non-apprehension of a thing capable of apprehension if it should have existed. The definition of the capacity of anupalabdhi to lead to knowledge of the non-existence of a thing is as follows: “The capacity of non-apprehension is the fact of its being a non-apprehension whose counter-positive, viz., apprehension, may be assumed from the existence assumed in the substratum.” To make this clear, the pramana here is anupalabdhi, or non-apprehension of an author. The pratiyogi is authorship which is a knowable thing. The substratum is the beginningless tradition. The yogyata is the capacity of the author to have been known, if an author had existed, in the form of memory of the author due to the existence of the beginningless tradition. The prama is the resultant knowledge that arises from the fact that the Vedas have no author; from the fact that no author is known, despite there being a beginningless tradition in which the memory of an author would have been known if there had been an author.
SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE FROM OTHER TRADITIONS
The seers say that the Vedas are eternal because they are the very words that created the universe. Shankara states in the Brahma Sutra Bhashya states: “How again is it known that the universe originates from words? From direct revelation (Vedas) and inference (Smritis). Both of them show that words precede the creation. Brahma created the gods by thinking of the word ete; He created men and others by the word asgram; by the word indavah the manes; by the word tirahpavitram the planets; by the word asavah the hymns; by the word visvani the shastras; and by the word abhisuabhagah the other beings'(Rg.V.IX.62).” We shall look at the other traditions of the world and see how they connect the Universe and the Eternal Word, something similar to the Vedas.
The Religious And Philosophical Traditions Of Greece
The ancient literature of Greece says that in the beginning there was Chaos, and Prometheus fashioned the world out of this Chaos through Logos (The Word). In ancient Greece, chaos meant an ‘undistinguished form’ in which all things lay united with one another. In the Vedic tradition, this ‘chaos’ corresponds to avyakta, from which the universe evolves through the differentiating power of words (logos). The philosophy of Heraclites says that the universe is the Logos, always and for all eternity, and that it is the word by which things divide into the many. Though the Greeks held Logos to be the source of creation, there is no mention of the what or where of this Word. Socrates says that the Greek language came from an older language than that of Greece and also referred to the wisdom of Egypt. Several Greek philosophers and thinkers, such as Pythagoras and Plato, had their education in Egypt.
The Religion Of Egypt
The oldest civilization known to us today is perhaps the civilization of Egypt. Despite attempts by Christian missionaries and modern scholars to paint a picture of Egypt as a pagan land, the Egyptian religion was, beneath its outward persona of polytheism, essentially monotheistic. The Papyrus of Ani, the chief scribe of the Pharaoh, says: Men do not live once, in order to vanish forever. They live several lives in different places but not always in this world, and between each life there is a veil of shadows. Our religion teaches us that we live for eternity. In the eyes of men, God has many faces and each swears he has seen the true and only God. Yet it is not so, for all of these faces are merely the face of God. Our Ka, which is our double, reveals them to us in different ways.
The ancient Egyptians believed in one God without a name, gender, shape, or form and they called this God Emen-Ra (the Hidden Light), Atum-Ra (the source and end of all Light) and Eaau (the Power that has expanded to create the universe). One of the central books of Egyptian religion is ‘The Book of Coming Forth by Day’. The creation of the universe from the Word is in this book in the Chapter on Creation: At first, a voice cried against the darkness,… It was Temu rising up – his head, the thousand-petalled lotus. He uttered the word and one petal drifted from him, taking form on the water… Out of himself he created everything else – in a word: the skies, the oceans, the mountains, the plants, the gods, and men, and he named them. In another chapter occur the words: “I am eternal…. I am that which created the Word…I am the Word.” The Egyptians believed the original Word to have been Sound with the potency to create the world. But where is this Sound preserved? Nobody knows for sure, though the Egyptians believe that it was there, once in a remote past, in Atlantis.
The Religions Of Babylonia And Mesopotamia
Most of the gods and goddesses of Egypt, Babylon, and Mesopotamia were the same, though they bore different names in their respective languages. Today, some of the literature of Babylon and Mesopotamia, such as the Epics of Gilgamesh and the Epic of Creation, are popular in English. In all versions of the Epic of Creation, we find the idea of the creation of the world through names. These scriptures (of Babylon and Mesopotamia) speak of the creation of all beings through the act of naming them, which supports the idea of the universe having been created from the Eternal Word.
The Religion Of Zarathustra
Zarathustra marked the advent of the Prophets that were to found new religions. There is no specific mention in the Avesta, the Holy Book, of the Word by means of which God created the universe. But the Avesta mentions the Ahunavairya as the Sacred Word through which came the Religion of Zarathustra.
The Avesta consists of a number of books, or nasks, along with the commentaries (the Zends). Then there are the Yasnas and Yashts, hymns, chanted at the sacrifices. The Gathas and the Yasnas/Yashts are in a language very similar to Sanskrit, and the meters of the Yashts bear a close resemblance to the Vedic meters. It is difficult to say what the Scriptures of Zarathustra talk about the Eternal Word, from which God created the universe. The only observation is that the religion of Zarathustra is based on the revelations of a single prophet, in a language that is close to, but different from, Sanskrit, in contrast to the case of the Vedas, which are based on the visions of multiple rishis who all saw it in the same language, Vedic Sanskrit.
The Abrahamic Religions
JUDAISM
Abraham, the descendent of Noah, walked steadfastly in the path of God, and when he was over ninety years old, God chose him to make a covenant with. Jews and the Christians claim to be the Chosen Ones and in which case why should the Hindus consider themselves special in having the Vedas as their Scriptures? Both the books of the Jews and the Quran mention that there have been other prophets sent to the people by God and other religions instituted by God. However, the Religion of Abraham is the only religion founded by means of an Explicit Covenant with God. So, that answers what the term ‘Chosen Ones’ means.
There are two primary traditions in Judaism: the Written and the Oral. The Written Tradition (Tanakh) was later incorporated into the Christian Bible as the Old Testament. The Oral Tradition, which revolves around the Torah, goes under the name of Mishnah. The commentaries and subsequent discussions on the Mishnah were the Gemara. The Mishnah and the Gemara together is the Talmud. Now, with regard to the Word, in the very first lines of the Tanakh, in the chapter called ‘Genesis’, we find: “AND GOD SAID, LET THERE BE LIGHT; AND THERE WAS LIGHT.” (Genesis.Ch1, 1-3). This directly points to the differentiation of the formless void through Speech. Another direct reference in the Psalms: “BY THE WORD OF THE LORD were the heavens made; and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth.” (Psalms 33.6) Interestingly, the Psalms also mention the breath of God, corresponding to the description of the Vedas in the Indian tradition as the breath of Brahman. The newer versions of Tanakh effaces references suggesting the role of words, but the old Aramaic version reads: “I, BY MY WORD, have made the earth and created man upon it…” So, here too, in the Religion of Abraham, we find the idea of the world’s creation by the Word. The doctrine of the Word seems to have been familiar to the Jews because we find references to it in the writings of one of the greatest Jewish philosophers, Philo.
CHRISTIANITY
In the New Testament of the Bible, in the Gospel according to St. John, we find the following words: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” The same was at the beginning with God. “All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made.” (St. John. Ch.1, 1-3). The Christian Church has taken a very narrow view of these words as referring to Jesus only. While the Word does refer to Jesus, it also has a broader connotation because the same Bible also mentions that God, through the Word created the universe. And moreover, the words of the Gospel of St. John say immediately after speaking of the Word that all things came out of him. This would seem to be out of context if we take the Word in a narrow sense to mean only Jesus. A part of the problem with the Church was that it had made the concept of the Trinity – the oneness of the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit-as the central decree that every Christian had to express his faith by.
Christianity does not have an adequate philosophy to explain the Trinity satisfactorily. In the Vedic tradition, the explanation of the Trinity (the avatarhood of God wherein God is the same even in His descent) is by the doctrine of vivarta (of the Grammarians) and the Vaishnava doctrine of the Lord’s Svarupamsa as distinct from the jiva’s Vibhinnamsha. The Word in the New Testament has the same connotation as in the Old Testament, and the restrictive meaning accorded to the Word by the Christian Church is due to their inability to explain the nature of the Trinity satisfactorily.
ISLAM
Prophet Mohammad says that he was restoring the Religion of Abraham in its pristine form, the Original Law given to Ibrahim (Abraham) and Moosa (Moses) in times long past. Therefore, even though there is no specific mention of the Word in the Qur’an, the idea of the world created through the Word should be no different in Islam than it is in Judaism. But we have a peculiar situation in Islam. The Muslims claim that the entire Qur’an is apaurusheya representing the Final Seal of the Prophets.
In what way may it be said that the Qur’an is apaurusheya? According to the Muslims, the evidence for the eternality of the Qur’an comes from its incorruptibility, as mentioned in Sura 15.9, and its eternality preserved on a tablet in Heaven, as mentioned in Suras 85:21-22 of the Holy Book. The Muslims point to another set of Suras (43:2-4) to show that the Qur’an is the Mother of All Books:
“By the Book that
Makes things clear – (43.2)
“We have made it
A Quran in Arabic,
That ye may be able
To understand (and learn wisdom) (43.3)
“And verily, it is
In the Mother of the Book,
In Our Presence, high
(In dignity), full of wisdom.” (43.4)
“We have made it a Qur’an in Arabic” is the key to interpreting the true status of the Qur’an. Now, the significance of the Apaurusheyatva of the Vedas comes from it being the Eternal Sound and not from it being merely a scripture that reveals knowledge. There are other scriptures, the Smritis, that are eternal, albeit as words derived from their seeds in the Vedas. It is possible to conclude that the Qur’an (as well as the original scriptures of the Jews, of which the Qur’an is a copy in Arabic) is an eternal scripture. Unlike Christianity, Islam is predominantly a religion of the world — of how to live one’s life in this world in accordance with the Law. It is equivalent to the Vedic Dharma Shastras, and deeper scrutiny of the Qur’an (as well as the Talmud of the Jews) indeed reveals a striking similarity with the Manu Dharma Shastra if one makes allowance for the prevailing traditions of Arabia (and ancient Israel). The Manu Dharma Shastra itself makes such provisions for the existing traditions of the land. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the Qur’an is the Eternal Law in the form of Vishesha-Dharma for the peoples of Arabia, and hence the words ‘We have made it a Qur’an in Arabic’ indicate that the Law which is ‘Verily in the Mother of the Book’ has been given to you in the Arabic language.
As far as the Word is concerned, there is no reason to believe that the Islamic version is any different than the one that exists in Judaism.
The Qabalah
All Jews do not consider the Qabalah to be part of the Judaic tradition. But it nevertheless exists as an esoteric tradition among a section of the Jews, and it is a tradition that is deep. The Zohar is the primary text of the Qabalah. But unlike in the more popularized form of Judaism, God in Qabalism is not merely the Father, but he is both the Father and Mother. According to the Qabalah, God is the Absolute. The first principle and axiom of the Qabalah is the name of the Deity, Eheieh Asher Eheieh, which translates as “I am He who is”. It points to the indescribable inner Self rather than to an expressible Being. One may see its close similarity to Advaita. Qabalism text (Sefer Yetsirah) explains how God created the world by means of the twenty-two letters of the Hebrew alphabet and the ten numbers (digits) known as the Sefirot. Phonemes do not belong to any language; it is only when phonemes form a set known as the alphabet that it belongs to a language.
It would therefore be proper for us to first consider the meaning-bearing capacities of phonemes as they exist independently of any language so that it may throw light upon the things that the Qabalah is speaking about. Such a science exists in the Shaiva and Shakta traditions of India and the Qabalah bears an unmistakable and striking similarity to the Tantric traditions of the Shaivas and Shaktas. The Trika System of Kashmir Shaivism bears such a striking similarity to the Qabalah.
There are three distinct paths in the Trika System known as Shivopaya, the path of Shiva as explicated in the doctrine of Pratyabhijna; Shaktopaya, the path of Shakti as explicated in the doctrine of Mantras; and Anavopaya, the path of the Atomic soul as explained in the doctrine of Kundalini Yoga. The first is very close to Advaita Vedanta; the path of Shakti, known as the Science of Mantras, is the doctrine that shows us the way to interpret the meaning of the Qabalic doctrine of letters. At the heart of Shaktopaya is the doctrine of Matrika. It is the science of phonemes. It explains the meaning of each phoneme starting from ‘a’ to all the fifty-one phonemes including both the vowels and the consonants. It is these fifty-one letters that constitute the Sanskrit alphabet. The science of the alphabet is known as Matrikachakra, and it reveals that Shiva creates the entire universe from His Shakti, Devi, as constituted of letters. The first letter ‘a’ denotes chit-shakti, the primordial Shakti in the form of Shiva’s unwavering Light. The second letter ‘aa’ denotes ananda-shakti, the energy of Shiva in the form of bliss. The third and fourth letters ‘e’ and ‘ee’ represent iccha-shakti, the Will of Shiva in its two forms as unmoved Will and creative Will. And so on for all the remaining vowels. The Matrikacharkra also explains how the rules of grammar arise as well as how the mantras arise and how they obtain their potency. The Matrikachakra also explains the relation of mantra, the potent combination of words, and yantra, the object (the secret figure) which contains the potency of the mantra.
Shaivism and Matrikachakra are not antagonistic to the Vedic tradition. According to Grammar, the Vedas are undivided strings of words. In other words, the Vedic vakhyas are the fundamental units of speech, and words and phonemes are abstractions. Therefore, the doctrine of Matrika does not contradict the Vedas but explains the Vedic vakhyas without causing any detriment to them. And this is the way the Qabalah too seeks to explain the words of the Torah.
What is the relation of the Qabalah to the Vedas? The first thing we observe is that the Hebrew alphabet has only twenty-two letters, whereas Sanskrit has fifty-one. This is an indication that the Religion of the Torah in terms of twenty-two letters is a particular aspect (vishesha-dharma) of the universal religion of the universe. This is due to the fact that the religion arose as a Covenant made by God with Abraham in a specific place and specific time for a specific people. “I am the Lord, your Holy One, the creator of Israel, your King”. The land is Israel, the Holy Land. Everywhere in the Old Testament, the Lord is the Lord of Israel. The word actually used in the original texts of the Torah is not ‘Lord’, but it is ‘Tatragrammaton’, the same word used in the Qabalah to refer to God. Later editions of the Bible replaced it with the word ‘Lord’.
So, it leads us to the conclusion that the Torah is of the same nature as the Qur’an, preserved in the eternal scheme of God’s creation, but just as the Qur’an has “been made a Qur’an in Arabic” for the peoples of Arabia, the Torah has “been made a Torah in Hebrew” for the people of Israel. Islam and Judaism are branches of the same religion; the Qur’an actually claims to be a recovery of the religion of Abraham in the Arabic language.
RELIGIONS AND THE WORD
Every major religion of the world speaks of the Word as the instrument of the creation of the universe. Apaurusheyatva seems to be a universal doctrine held by all the major religions of the world. The Eternal Word preceding creation appears to be a universal doctrine. We now have the question: “Which of the Scriptures of the world, in any, is the Eternal Word?”
The religions of Greece, Egypt, Babylon, and Mesopotamia vaguely point to the Eternal Word without being able to say where the Word exists. The religion of Abraham and Christianity speaks of the Eternal Word, but there is no indication in its scriptures of what this Word is. Christianity focuses on the doctrine of the Trinity, whereby the Word becomes flesh in the form of Jesus without diluting the Unity of Godhead and Jesus. It is only in the Qabalah that we find a reference to the universe proceeding from letters but we have shown that this pertains to the Science of Matrika which purports to explain the deeper significances of scriptural sentences rather than point to any set of sentences as being the Original Word.
Vedic Religion which has Veda as its central scripture is not based on the revelation of a single Prophet but on the Eternal Word seen by multiple sages- ‘rishis’. It is a religion built entirely around the Eternal Word; that has an immense body of diverse scriptures having their seat and ground in the Eternal Word; that has its Grammar and Etymology derived from the Eternal Word; that has different philosophies performing different roles and functions as laid out by the Eternal Word; that has human actions, stages of life, and religious laws determined by the Eternal Word; and that has a name Eternal Religion – Sanatana Dharma. It is a Religion that still exists and thrives in the world under this very name. So, which of the world’s scriptures is the Eternal Word, the very Word from which God fashioned the universe by uttering them? It is unmistakably the Vedas.
There is evidence in the other scriptures and traditions of the world that points to the apaurusheyatva of the Vedas. The Old Testament tells us how different languages arose in the world. In the days of yore, much before the time of Abraham, much before the institution of God’s Covenant with Abraham, and much before the time of Zarathustra, there was only one language on earth. “And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech.” (Genesis 11:1).
There is only one language that has all the marks of belonging to a beginningless line from creation: uncreated; a perfect grammar; an etymology in which all words trace; known as the language of the gods (Deva bhasha); a script called the town-script of the gods (Devanagari); and the source of all knowledge and vidyas. This is the language of the Vedas—Sanskrit. Moreover, Sanskrit is a language that has fifty-one letters in its alphabet, which explains the entirety of the creation. Would it be unreasonable then to conclude that the Hebrew language, with an alphabet containing twenty-two letters, came from a Mother Language having fifty-one letters of a universal language, and that the Vedas are the seed out of which the Manu Dharma Shastra in Sanskrit and the Torah in Hebrew and the Qur’an in Arabic have come out like sprouts in their respective languages, as Vishesha Dharmas, for those specific peoples of the earth for whom God meant them to be the Governing Laws to abide by?
The Vedas as the Eternal Word, and Sanskrit as the Mother Language, provide the Syncretic Ground in which all the religions converge to make a meaningful pattern. The pattern constitutes evidence not only to show that the Vedas are Apaurusheya but also to point to the truth that all religions have a common source and would form a family of universal brotherhood (and sisterhood) if only the human mind would be rid of its petty bigotries and sectarian dogmas.
PART 4
THE PURVA MIMAMSA PROOF
Foreword To The Purva Mimamsa Doctrine Of Words
Purva Mimamsa is perhaps one of the most abstruse to understand. It is a philosophy that speaks about a supernal region far beyond the realm of the universe, in a realm in which the perfect word and the perfect object lie in absolute silence before they burst upon the stage of the world, clothed with terms ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’. Mimamsa speaks that illusion does not pertain to words and objects; it pertains to the notion of the eternal word and eternal object as being temporal and ephemeral entities.
In Western philosophy, we would find traces of it in the two philosophies considered the most difficult of all to comprehend – the philosophy of Parmenides of Elea (along with the Eleatic dialogues of Socrates) and the philosophy of Spinoza. Words are mystical things. The science of words is highly esoteric. The Rig Veda says that ordinary people know only the fourth, articulate, stage of speech and that the other three stages lie concealed from them. “Four are the grades of speech, the learned brahmanas know them. Three of them are deposited in secret and indicate no meaning to a common man; for men speak the fourth grade which is phonetically expressed.” (Rig Veda 1.164.45).
The greatest hindrance we face in grasping the unauthoredness of the Vedas is the inability of the mind to form a conception of an unauthored scripture. The pramana called anupalabdhi shows the unauthoredness of Vedas to be the case since authorship would have had the capacity of being perceived and remembered if it should have existed. In order to grasp the eternality of the Vedas one would need to understand the philosophy of Purva Mimamsa. The arguments provided by the Mimasakas to counter the views of the opponents of apaurusheyatva are extensive and many of them are extremely subtle in nature. This is a summary of those arguments.
An Approach To Understanding The Eternality Of Words
The idea that a text can exist only when it has a human author is based on the unexamined idea that the human bodily apparatus is a necessary ground for words to arise. That is, the capacity for words to reside and for speech to arise in a human being is the conscious principle which is a distinct and different entity from the body in which it appears as the individual self or pratyagatman. This conscious principle, which exists in the body as the self is also the Consciousness that pervades the entire universe. As explained in the Vedanta texts, it appears to be in the body only due to an adjunct superimposed on the all-pervading Consciousness. Therefore, words can exist even if there should be no human being present in the universe because the principle in which words reside and from which they arise as speech is the eternally existent Consciousness.
The notion that words exist only when articulated as speech is one of those many unexamined beliefs that persist for a person when he is in samsara. But a critical examination of speech reveals that the knowledge of words and their meanings has to exist a priori for a person to be able to speak those words meaningfully. The knowledge of words that a person has exists in him even when he is sleeping. The knowledge of words existed in the person even during the intermediate period when he was not speaking them; they were then not manifest, that is all.
If we consider the expression ‘knowledge of words’ in respect of a knower, the word ‘knowledge’ refers to the knowledge that the knower has, and the word ‘words’ refers to the object of the knowledge. There cannot be knowledge without there being an object of knowledge. When a person who knows ‘the word rose’ is sleeping, the object of the knowledge that persists in him is the word ‘rose’. Therefore, it follows that words exist as objects of knowledge in a person even when he is sleeping and that words need not be manifest as sound for them to exist.
An analogy may help to illustrate how a word may exist even when not heard (manifest). In a stringed musical instrument, the musical note exists in the string of the veena as the ‘unstruck’ note when it is not sounding and as the ‘struck’ note when it is sounding. Words are similar in nature to this – they remain unstruck when not spoken and they become struck when spoken. The ground for the existence of words is the all-pervading and eternal Consciousness. And these words reside as objects of knowledge in Consciousness even when they are not manifest as articulated speech.
Knowledge, Words And Objects – Traditional Semiotics
A word is that kind of object which is always connected to another object. This is crucial in understanding the apaurusheyatva of the Vedas. The study of the relationships between words and objects is a branch of linguistics known as ‘semiotics’. More specifically, semiotics is the study of signs and of discerning what it is that a sign points to. Unlike in modern linguistics, where there is no certainty or agreement with respect to what it is that constitutes the object of a word, in Indian semiotics the object of the word is the thing itself that exists in the world (or in reality). And unlike in modern sciences and philosophies, in Indian linguistics and Indian traditional philosophies, the world is the world directly perceived.
When a person knows an object, there is always a sign (name) and a signified (object) in the field of consciousness. The Brahadaranyaka Upanishad says that the entire universe is nama-rupa, or name and form. Names and forms lie in Brahman Itself, as the unmanifested and undifferentiated seeds from which manifest names and forms spring onto the stage of creation. The Upanishads emphasize that the relation between names (words) and forms (objects) abides eternally since they exist in the field of consciousness even before manifestation in an undifferentiated state. Thus, there cannot be knowledge of an object without there being a word signifying the object.
It does not matter whether the words are Vedic words or are words adopted by convention; a word necessarily needs to be present as a reference for an object to be known as the referent. One may choose words arbitrarily (small child language or animal language) to represent an object, but the relationship between the sign and the signified is determined by a prior relationship that abides eternally. A word is not merely a set of phonemes because the phonemes do not exist concurrently when spoken and there is nothing to bind them together. And this is one of the key reasons why a word distinguishes from the sound uttered. For the sound to become a word, it needs to have a binding factor that binds it. And that binding factor is the meaning itself.
Therefore, since a word is not a word without the idea (the meaning) binding the phonemes together, the idea (of the object) is an inseparable constituent of the word. So, to speak of their relationship as non-eternal is a contradiction in terms. We ignore this fact and treat a word as something existing separately from the object and it is this tendency that obstructs our attempts to make progress in grasping the nature of apaurusheyatva. The relation between a word and its object is also independent of individuals or convention. Since the identity of the object itself is independent of an individual, the nature of the object too is independent of the individual because it is the nature of the thing in the world whose identity the word is denoting.
On Convention
It is not easy to grasp how a word chosen by convention can be eternal or have an eternal relation to its meaning. One finds it difficult to dislodge the idea that before convention chooses the sound-form (of the word) to denote an object, it would have had no relation to that object. There can be no answer to this question from a worldly perspective; the answer can come only from a transcendental perspective. What is convention? What was it that made a particular group of people come together to form a language-speaking community? Creation proceeds out of the adrshta of jivas. That adrshta on account of which creation proceeds, that very same adrshta is responsible for a particular group of people to be born on earth and their lives to interleave with those of one another, and it is the same adrshta on account of which the unmanifest eternal word comes forth into the created world as a ‘choice’ of the language speaking community.
THE PROOF
This is a summary based primarily upon the translation of Jaimini Purva Mimamsa Sutras by Ganganath Jha and the translations of Kumarila Bhatta’s Slokavartika. This section is in five parts according to the subject matter of the sutras. In the original article, Naik discusses each sutra and its bhashya (commentary) separately. For this article, we have condensed each sutra and its explanation into one unit.
Part I – The Context
This part shows the context in which the sutras (1.1 to 1.5) relating to the eternality of words arise.
1.1: Now, therefore, (there must be) an inquiry into (the nature of) Duty.
1.2: Dharma or Duty is (something) desirable and the only source of its knowledge is Vedic injunction.
1.3: An inquiry into the means of the true knowledge of Dharma becomes necessary.
1.4: That cognition of a man which proceeds upon the contact of the sense-organs with existing objects, is sense-perception; and this is not the means of knowing dharma; because it apprehends only objects existing at the present time.
1.5: On the other hand, the relation of the word with its meaning is inborn (and eternal); consequently injunction (which is a form of a word) is the means of knowing dharma; and it is unfailing in regard to objects not perceived (by other means of knowledge); it is authoritative (the Word par excellence), according to Badarayana, especially as it is independent or self-sufficient in its authority.
Part II – Objections To The Doctrine Of Eternality Of Words (Sutra 1.6 to 1.11)
1.6: Some people hold that the word is non-eternal because we always find them come into existence by the effort of the person using or uttering it; and such an existence can only be evanescent.
1.7: Word must be evanescent because, in fact, we find that it does not continue to exist for any length of time; one moment pronounced, and the next moment gone.
1.8: Words must be non-eternal because we find people making use of the word ‘karoti’ (produce) with regard to words. Just as they say ‘ghatankaroti‘ (produce the jar), similarly in the case of words, they must mean ‘he makes or produces the word.’
1.9: We find that more than one person and in more than one place at the same time hears a word. For example, one may hear the word ‘cow’ at the same time in Kashi and in Patna by different people. For a thing to exist simultaneously in many places, the thing would either have to be an all-pervading substance or it would have to be a limited thing made existent in different places. Since the word is not an all-pervading substance, it follows that when perceived by different people at different places, it produces in those different places. Thus, any single word is not one, but many, all produced in different places.
1.10: In many cases the words which appear in the original form become modified into another form. Undeniably, there is a modification in the case of words; and hence, words are non-eternal.
1.11: In the case of a jar manifested by lamps, the jar remains the same even if hundreds of lamps illumine it. But the volume of a word is greater when pronounced by many people as compared to the volume when a single person pronounces it; therefore, it proves that a word is non-eternal because if it were the manifestation of an eternal word, the volume would have been the same and unmodified irrespective of the number of people pronouncing it.
Part III – Refutation Of Objections And Establishment Of Eternality Of Words (Sutras 1.12 to 1.23)
1.12: The objector says that words are non-eternal because they are a product of effort and are momentary. However, Mimansa says that the effort of the human utterer simply manifests, or renders perceptible, the word that has always been in existence. Whether we regard the eternally existent word as manifested by human effort, or as brought into existence by the utterer, the perceiving of the word would be only for a moment. Thus, the objection lacks the capability of dislodging the doctrine of eternality of words.
1.13: The objection says that a word cannot be eternal because it appears clearly to be impermanent. But the argument is fallacious because only the eternality of words can explain satisfactorily the momentary perception of the word. The word heard at one moment and not at the other is because it is only at one moment that the manifesting agency (human utterance many times) is operating towards its manifestation, and not at all moments. Whenever a man goes on uttering the word, we hear it; so as long as the utterance is operating, the perception is there; when the utterance ceases to operate, the perception ceases thus showing that what the utterance does is only to manifest, or render perceptible, what is already existing. If, on the other hand, the word comes into existence by the utterance in the same manner as the potter produces the jar, the word would continue to exist even after the utterance has ceased to operate just as the pot continues to exist even after the productive agency ceases. There is no production or creation of the word as there is in the case of a jar. What the manifesting agency of the utterance does is to remove or set free the obstruction that had impeded the manifestation of the word and allow it to manifest through the vocal instrument of the utterer.
1.14: The objection (purva-paksha) says that people make use of the word ‘produce’ with regard to the word. However, the production of the word implies the manifesting agency ‘utterance’ and not to the word. To clarify, production refers not to the production of the word but to the act of uttering so that the word manifests.
1.15: The objector says that like the sun, the word-sound heard at the same time by different people in different places proves that the word is not one, and is not eternal. This hardly proves that the word is many and transient. The example of the sun in fact weakens the position of purva-paksha. The sun seen at the same time by many persons at different places is only one and eternal. In the same manner, it is quite natural that the word should be one and eternal, and yet different people at different places at the same time can perceive it.
1.16: When pronouncing the two words ‘dadhi‘ and ‘atra’ pronounced in close proximity, we have the form ‘dadhyatra’, and being a modification of the word proves that words are not eternal. What is modifiable is non-eternal. The reply is that this is not so because in the form ‘dadhyatra’ the syllable ‘dhya’ is not a modification of the original syllables ‘dhi‘ and ‘a’; it is an entirely different letter. If the form ‘ya‘ as occurring in ‘dhya’ were a modification of the ‘i’ of ‘dadhi’ and ‘a’ of atra, then there would be no ‘ya’ apart from these letters. For example, ice being a modification of water, there can be no ice without water. But in the case of ‘ya’, there is no such inseparable connection with ‘i’ and ‘a’ as there should be between the original and the modification.
1.17: When many persons utter the same word, we perceive that the magnitude of the word undergoes an increase which shows that the word is liable to change thus proving the transient nature of words. In reply to this, when many persons pronounce the same word, what happens is not any change in the word itself, but only in the loudness of the tone, which becomes louder or fainter as the number of persons becomes more or less.
1.18: Refuting the objections of the adversary, there are further reasons to support the doctrine of eternality of words. The whole idea of the transience of words is that the utterance of a speaker brings the word into existence. However, we utter words not for the purpose of producing or creating a word, but for the purpose of expressing what the word denotes. The word has to be known a priori because otherwise there would be a lack of knowledge of the very thing which needs expression. And also, the purpose of verbal expression would not serve if the word uttered were transient. If destroyed immediately after utterance, it would not be in existence at the time that the hearer would need them to comprehend its meaning. The very fact of the comprehension being there in the mind of the hearer shows that the word we utter is not evanescent, but is lasting and eternal.
1.19: We find that every word, as a word, on several occasions is invariably recognizable by all people as being the same; whenever we hear a word – ‘cow’ for instance – we always recognize it as the same word ‘cow’ that we had heard on previous occasions. This recognition of sameness is with regards to all words and in the minds of all. the word heard and used today is precisely the same heard from time immemorial; that is to say, it is eternal.
1.20: When pronouncing a certain word (like cow) more than once, we say that we have used the word ‘five’, ‘ten’, or ‘twelve’ times. We do not say that we have used ‘five’, ‘ten’, or ‘twelve’ different words. If the word produces and destroys each time, we should have spoken of so many words and not of the same word as spoken so many times. Thus, universal usage also shows that the word is the same whenever used; that is to say, it is eternal.
1.21: In the case of all things that are liable to destruction people always find some cause of destruction; there is no such cause or agent for destruction perceptible in the case of words; consequently, we cannot admit of such destruction; and words must be ‘indestructible’, that is, eternal.
1.22: The opponents of the eternality of words (Nyayaikas in this case) bring forward the Vedic text ‘the air becomes the word‘ in support of the contention that the word has a beginning as it is a mere combination of air-particles. But this text cannot refer to what we know as the ‘word’. The ear cannot perceive air, according to the Logicians, being perceptible by the sense of touch alone.
1.23: There are texts which say ‘vacha virupinityaya’ – ‘by the word which is unmodifiable and eternal’. There the word is distinctly eternal. Stress is on the eternality of words; if words have an origin, they cannot be infallible. Such origin would have to be some intelligent person, and no such intelligent person is infallible. Hence the fallacious view regarding the non-eternality of words would strike at the infallible authority of the word – and of the Veda, which is a collection of words – upon which the whole fabric of Dharma rests.
Part IV – The Eternality Of Veda (Of Vedic Vakhyas)
The sutrakara first presents the objection of the adversary in sutra 24 and then refutes it in sutras 25 and 26 to establish the eternality of the Vedas.
1.24 (the objection): We grant that words express their meanings and that they are eternal; all that this proves is that words provide us with correct ideas; how does this prove the authority of the Vedic injunctions? These injunctions are in the form of sentences containing more than one word; and for the comprehension of a conglomeration of words, we need something more than the comprehension of the meanings of the component words. Consequently, the Mimamsaka has succeeded in establishing the authority of words only and not in establishing the authority of the Vedic sentences.
In the sutra occurs the word ‘avachanah‘ meaning ‘not expressive (of the meaning)’. Some people read this as ‘rachanah‘ which would make the sutra read as follows: “Even though words were) eternal, the meanings of sentences must be regarded as having an origin in human agency, and for this reason, they cannot be accepted as eternal and authoritative on matters relating to dharma as they do not depend entirely upon the meaning of eternal words.”
1.25 (the reply): The meaning of the sentence does depend on the meanings of the words composing it; there is nothing to prove that the sentence has any other meaning than that afforded by the component words. For instance, in the sentence ‘agnihotranjuhuyat svargakamah’ we find that the word expressive of the Agnihotra sacrifice and also the word expressive of desiring heaven (svargakamah) are both in close proximity to the word ‘juhuyat‘ which denotes the act of offering. The meaning afforded by this sentence is obtained through the signification of the two former words taken along with the signification of the verb. The meaning is that ‘one desirous of heaven should offer the agnihotra‘, which is nothing more than the denotations of the three words linked together. Hence, when the meanings of the words are eternal, sentences formed by these words are also eternal. There is no incongruity in the view that the Veda is the trustworthy authority for all matters relating to Dharma.
1.26: In ordinary usage, it is only when we know the meanings of each individual word that we can use or comprehend the meaning of the sentence; from this analogy, the meaning of the sentence depends upon the meanings of the words. That is to say, it needs admission that the meaning of the sentence ‘agnihotranjuhuyat svargakamah’ is nothing more or less than what is signified by each of those three words.
An Explanation: There is a tendency among modern people to treat the word-sound and the object that it refers to in a disjunct manner isolated from each other. It is this tendency to divorce the two which makes it difficult to grasp how a sentence may be eternal; for even if granted that words are eternal, it seems unimaginable that words can come together to form a sentence without human agency. The difficulty arises because we treat words and sentences in isolation, by themselves, just as we treat objects such as jar, table, etc. in isolation from other objects. While the components of a jar such as particles of clay simply exist in nature, the production of a pot needs human agency for the particles of clay to come together as a pot. When words are in isolation from their meanings as other objects then it appears that the same kind of agency would require to produce sentences. But sentences are related to knowledge and the nature of words as signs obviates the need for any such thing as the production of sentences from a conglomeration of words.
A word is something that is comprehensible by an idea binding together the phonemes. This idea – the binding idea, is the meaning. The meaning represents the knower’s knowledge of the word. Now, a knower’s knowledge does not exist in the form of knowledge of meanings of single objects alone. They exist as all kinds of knowledge such as knowledge of actions, causes, and so forth. Single words cannot represent these kinds of knowledge.
Even single words exist as parts of sentences in a knower’s field of consciousness as explained by Sri Shankaracharya: “In every word, there is the potentiality of a sentence ‘it exists’. When someone says ‘tree’, one understands that it exists…For bare words, like bare letter-sounds are meaningless, and do not amount to communication. Just as one aims at indicating a word by joining together the letter-sounds, so with words too: the means of constructing a sentence is by looking to other words as well. So, validity is in the sentence alone, since there is no understanding of the object from the use of a word in isolation. Even where an isolated word (like the name Devadatta) is supposed to be its context, still inevitably it supplements in the mind with the sense of existence, so that the word means ‘It is Devadatta’ and so on; without context, it is not intelligible.” (Vivarana on Yoga Sutra, III.17).
So, the eternal existence of sentences is the eternal sign in Consciousness that refers to the eternal object in the Omniscience of Brahman. Words also need not be manifest as speech for them to reside in Consciousness. This explains how sentences always persist in Consciousness and are eternal.
Part V –The Veda Is Apaurusheya (It Has No Human Author)
Sutras 27 and 28 present the objections and sutras 29 to 32 provide the refutations of these objections and the final establishment of the Apaurusheyatva of the Vedas.
1.27: According to some people the Vedas are the work of human authors; being, as they are, named after men. We find various sections of the Veda named after men like ‘Kathaka’ after the name of Katha, ‘Paippalada’ after the name of Pippalada, and so forth.
1.28: The Veda mention many non-eternal things. We find such statements in the Veda as ‘Auddalakih akamayata’ (Audalaki desired) and ‘Babara pravahani’ (Babana desired), and so forth. The mention of persons and events shows that the Veda cannot be eternal. That is to say, the presence of such sentences as the above proves that the sentences were composed long after the persons spoken of therein lived on the earth. That is to say, the Veda has had a beginning in time.
1.29: However, we have established the eternality of all words, whether divine or human. Hence the objection is groundless. We need to answer the arguments put forth by the opponent.
1.30: The name of the Vedic sections is based upon exceptionally excellent study and teaching of that section by a particular person. These persons had direct insight and were the first to expound them.
1.31: The other is only a similarity of sounds. As for the mention of the names of men and things in the Veda, there is nothing to show that the word found in the Veda was actually the name of a person. It is, in fact, a resemblance arising out of the fact that men and things took these names. The names of persons used in the Vedas are common nouns and not proper nouns. The persons bore the names subsequently in the cycles of creation. Hence, this argument of the objector does not detract from the eternality of the Vedas.
1.32: The opponents of Vedic authority argue that the Veda cannot be authoritative and trustworthy because it contains such apparently absurd statements as ‘the cows sat at the sacrifice’, ‘the trees performed the sacrifice’, and so forth. In answer to this, though these statements are absurd when taken by themselves, they cease to be so when taken along with the context in which they occur. All these sentences are the section dealing with a certain sacrifice; and in praise of this sacrifice, the declaration is that so excellent and so manifestly desirable are its results that it induces even trees to perform it. It is only natural that such intelligent beings as men should perceive the excellence of the action, and engage in performing it. There is nothing incongruous and absurd in the sentence if thus intelligently interpreted.
Thus then the Veda, not being the work of a human author (whereby it is free from all the discrepancies consequent upon such authorship) and there being nothing in the text of the Veda itself that shakes this authority, it must be admitted that it is a trustworthy and authoritative source of knowledge on all matters relating to Dharma; and as it has been shown that no other source of such knowledge is available, the Veda must be also acknowledged to be the only source of knowledge relating to Dharma.
CONCLUSION
This is perhaps a rare attempt to explicate the idea of the apaurusheyatva of the Vedas. The most important aspect to understand here is that apaurusheyatva does not mean an absence of knowledge of the authors of the Vedas but knowledge of the absence of human authors. This criterion is of utmost importance when a scholar approaches the texts. Even the modern-day Advaitins, a little detached from the traditional understanding, make a mistake here. Of course, Chittaranjan Naik makes it clear this series of articles is meant for educating people who are not familiar with the theme of apaurusheyatva of the Vedas. It is not meant to be a formal proof of Veda’s eternality, which requires more work.
Sanskrit is very strict about the use of words and their meaning; it also developed construction rules for words and word meanings instead of building dictionaries. That is, the speakers of this language formulated linguistic rules to understand the meanings of words and sentences instead of seeking meaning primarily in authorial intentions. As Dr. Balagangadhara says, when Indian culture claims that the Vedas do not have a human author, it becomes impossible to ask questions about authorial intentions. That is, ‘why were Vedas written or spoken?’ is more difficult to answer than the question ‘why did God call Moses to Mount Sinai?’ God’s word, the Bible, itself answers these questions. However, for such questions about the Vedas, our texts do not raise answers, though many Indologists do. One of the facts that upset Indologists about Indian texts is precisely this question: who wrote it and why? Indian traditions consider these questions to be irrelevant since the Vedas are eternal and unauthored; hence, the dating, authorship, and intentions of the authors remained inconsequential in seeking liberation while diving deep into the texts.
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