RANDOM MUSINGS

First Published in Brhat Online Magazine as a 4-part series

Links provided at the end

PART 1

The Nyāya system is the most systematic application of logic in the acquisition of knowledge (epistemology). Vaiśeṣika is an explanation of the reality around us (ontology), beginning with the description of the indestructible atoms as the basis of all reality. Though arising independently, gradually they merged for common study. Gautama founded the Nyāya school in the 3rd century BCE; later modifications resulted in the modern school of Navya Nyāya in 1200 CE. Nyāya, or Indian logic, is an instrument for the understanding and discovery of reality quite unlike Western logic — a formal structural inquiry unrelated to the world. The aim of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is liberation of the Self from the bondage and suffering due to its association with the body. No such purpose exists in Western traditions discussing either ontology or epistemology.

It is an unfortunate tragedy of Indian educational systems that Indian darśanas, especially Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, have been completely obliterated from the secular education policies of modern India.

A most fascinating domain dating back thousands of years, and developed by the Indian ṛṣis to explain the world around us; they deeply discuss logic or the means of acquiring knowledge, yet simply disappeared from the public perception. This became one of the reasons for the derooting and deracination we today see in educated Indians.

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika form the backbone of our Indian Knowledge Systems, which have a prodigal output in both worldly (aparā) and otherworldly (parā) domains. This was not only in Saṃskṛta but in many vernacular languages. It is sad that most Indians are deeply unaware of the fantastic knowledge generation of Indian culture in mathematics, astronomy, logic, metallurgy, physics, shipbuilding, medicine, agriculture, town planning, sanitation, architecture, literature, poetry, linguistics, drama, to name a few. The paradigm of understanding the world differs from the modern scientific materialistic perspective, but that did not prevent Indian knowledge systems from generating a copious amount of literature in varied domains. Our educational policies hardly stress this aspect of our past.

This series of essays is a summary and abridgement of a wonderful book, ‘The Hindu Realism’, by a great scholar, Śrī Jagadish Chandra Chatterjee, written way back in 1912. The summary is followed by some of the key ideas of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, as discussed by eminent philosopher Śrī Chittaranjan Naik in his essays and books: ‘Natural Realism and The Contact Theory of Perception’, and ‘On the Existence of the Self’.

The author of this series is not an authority but rather a student who is exploring the richness of Indian culture and aims to introduce the uninitiated to the remarkable depth of these great philosophical systems. It is an invitation for the readers to explore fully the above-mentioned works and other texts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the most comprehensive and elaborate systems to explain the world around us. Western traditions curiously still struggle with coming to the final ideas regarding reality and knowledge that Indian ṛṣis had sorted out, wrapped up, and kept intact – without the need to change for at least two thousand years. This is indeed a remarkable achievement of Indian civilization, but sadly, most people are ignorant about it.

Basics of Indian Philosophical Traditions or Darśanas

Indian systems are classified into two groups: orthodox (āstika) and non-orthodox (nāstika) depending on whether they accept or reject the Vedas as a trusted source of knowledge. Interestingly, āstika (theism) and nāstika (atheism) are not terms to denote the belief or its absence, respectively, in the notion of God. Most Indian darśanas have no real need to invoke God in their philosophical explanations. The non-orthodox systems are the Cārvāka, Bauddha, and Jaina darśanas. The orthodox systems include the six systems called Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsa, and Vedānta. The orthodox schools come in pairs: Yoga-Sāṃkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsa-Vedānta. JC Chatterjee, in his book, combines the last two into a single group called Vedānta.

Apart from only materialism, both non-orthodox and orthodox schools have certain core common ideas and some of these are distinct from Western philosophical traditions:

1. An explanation of reality should not sacrifice reasoning and experience.
2. Philosophy in Indian systems, never a dry intellectual exercise, carries a soteriological power — the power of intense individual transformation from ignorance to wisdom and from bondage to freedom.
3. There is no original sin but original ignorance.
4. In all systems (except Cārvāka), karma is a central doctrine of cause and effect at the levels of body, mind, and intellect.
5. Karma intricately links to the idea of reincarnation or rebirth in all systems.
6. Mokṣa, a common theme for all, is the final state of enlightenment with no further births, in stark contrast to the western focus on eternal life.
7. Almost all Indian philosophies accept perfect happiness as a state of no further births.
8. Despite the perception of Buddhism as non-orthodox, scholars such as Śrī Aurobindo and Ananda Coomaraswamy demonstrate the subtle differences. Though the Vedas were “rejected,” Buddhism has close parallels with the Upaniṣadic philosophy.
9. The final state in Vedānta is a mokṣa with no further births, after realizing a positive state of Brahman or the Self. The final state in Buddhism is nirvāṇa, with again no further births, but the world, mind, and soul end in a nothingness. This difference is hardly a reason in the traditional culture of Bhārata, where debates always existed to give credence to the colonial story of a violent “driving” out of Buddhism by Hinduism.
10. The practical aspects of Yoga and meditation are acceptable routes in all systems to reach the state of liberation.
11. All focus on individual effort, if necessary, across many births to liberate from ignorance. The role of a teacher or book is only as a guide on the path; finally, the individual’s effort is responsible for one’s own mokṣa, achievable in the present life.

The goal of human life in Indic philosophies firmly remains mokṣa or enlightenment. The journey starts with an intellectual apprehension of this goal — to finally attain mokṣa through various routes. This is the basic framework of Indian darśanas. The differences mainly are in the description of the routes to mokṣa and the nature of the individual soul, the universal soul, their relationship, and the state of final mokṣa.

Indian darśanas are not something derived from basic principles to finally arrive at a conclusion. As Naik says:

A darśana is a Single Vision in which all its elements, including epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, the practice, and the fruits of sadhana, are like various organs that form a single integral whole. Darśana strictly is not synonymous with philosophy.

However, to avoid confusion, one can broadly consider them as equivalent terms.

Vaiśeṣika on the World Around Us

Ṛṣi Kaṇāda (somewhere between the 6th century BCE and the 2nd century BCE) was the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system, and later authors like Praśastapāda (5th century CE) and Śrīdhara (9th century CE) wrote commentaries. It is important to recognise that Indian Knowledge Systems had the Self as the basis of both its ontology and epistemology. The perception and knowledge of the reality of the world around us is an inside-to-outside process. In the Western traditions, these are an outside-to-inside process. In the Indian view, the ultimate building block of the world is the Self, also known as Brahman or the Primary Consciousness. Everything in the material world proceeds from the Self.

In Western traditions, the ultimate building block of the matter began with the atoms and has progressed to subatomic matter (quarks and electrons). Contemporary physics, albeit a bit argued, speaks about “strings” as the most basic of building blocks. Of course, matter, as we presently know, constitutes only 5% of the universe. The rest is dark matter and dark energy, roughly 25% and 70% respectively, the nature of which remains unknown to us at present. In Western scientific traditions, science builds up everything from the finest aspects of matter to increasing orders of complexity to finally generate consciousness.

Thus, in Indian traditions, everything begins from Consciousness and in Western traditions, everything begins from matter. The fundamental belief in explaining the world may differ in both, but in terms of doing science or in developing technology in the gross physical world, there is no handicap. The two paradigms share an understanding of matter and physical forces. It is a hegemonical pushing of Indian philosophies to the realm of religion (which actually started in the German universities of the 18th century) that prevents us from imagining that Indian philosophies or darśanas are equally capable of explaining matters of the external world.

The Vaiśeṣika system is the best example of this. It is also known as the ‘atomistic school’ because of its elaborate atomic theory to explain the universe. The Vaiśeṣika school has important contributions in the fields of the theory of metals, the theory of motion, the physiology of dreams, the nature of sound, the theory of numbers, and many other scientific areas. Kaṇāda also distinguishes between mind and consciousness. Kaṇāda theorised that gurutva (gravity) was responsible for falling objects on Earth. There was an exhaustive study of motion by the Vaiśeṣika school, and most impressive perhaps would be the three sutras proposed 1800 years before Newton’s laws.

• वेगःनिमित्तविशेषातकर्मणोजायते | Change of motion is due to impressed force
• वेगःनिमित्तापेक्षात कर्मणोजायते नियतदिकक्रिया प्रबन्धहेतु | Change of motion is proportional to the impressed force and is in the direction of the force.
• वेगःसंयोगविशेषविरोधी | Action and reaction are equal and opposite.

The practical and scientific ideas of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school have led scholars like James Ballantyne to believe that it offers a foundation for introducing modern Western science.

The Hindu Realism by Jagadish Chadra Chatterjee: A Summary

Hindu philosophy, or darśanas, means the branch of learning that demonstrates by reasoning propositions in regard to:

1. What a person ought to do to gain true happiness in specific circumstances and existence.
2. What he ought to realise by direct experience – the absolute freedom and independence from suffering, as already proposed, reasoned, and established by qualified authorities.

The Saṃskṛta name for philosophy is darśana śāstra (synonyms: vicāra śāstra, manana śāstra) — the science of views with regards to the above two propositions. The first relates to the duties (karma and dharma) of what a person ought to do. The second relates to the truths of the essential nature of things — tattva — which enables absolute freedom and independence.

Thus, Indian philosophy would correspond to the Western idea of philosophy only when the latter talks about the above two propositions. There are two broad divisions of Hindu philosophy for rational demonstrations:

1. Dharma-mīmāṃsa (or karma-mīmāṃsa) relates to the duties of the person to gain happiness.
2. Tattva-mīmāṃsa (mokṣa-darśana or Metaphysical Philosophy).

They are not exclusive because dharma-mīmāṃsa also has a metaphysical basis. Several schools of metaphysical philosophy exist, but five are considered fundamental. These are:

1. Vaiśeṣika
2. Nyāya
3. Sāṃkhya
4. Yoga
5. Vedānta (JC Chatterjee collapses Mīmāṃsa and Vedānta into a single group)

They are grouped into three pairs: Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, and Vedānta.

Dharma-mīmāṃsa has a metaphysical basis of its own, and in this regard, it is considered a part of the Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya group. Again, the three systems are not mutually contradictory. They form a graduated series that caters to different grades of minds, both intellectual and temperamental. The branch of Hindu philosophy basically tries to address the various types of human minds.

Contrasting Pre-Suppositions of Hindu And Western Philosophy

There are certain preconceptions and presuppositions of Hindu philosophy that stand in contrast to the presuppositions of western philosophy while addressing certain issues of life and reality.

Western Philosophy	Hindu Philosophy
Metaphysical truths, especially of Eastern traditions, are only a matter of speculation or inferences based on faith. Metaphysical truths are never known to be directly experienced.	Metaphysical truths can be known by direct experience.
Even if direct experience is possible, there is no person known who has claimed this.	Ṛṣis or perfected seers know this truth and they existed in the past, exist in the present, and will exist in the future too.
Views Hindu philosophy as mutually contradictory since it involves speculation.	These ṛṣis, by knowing directly, have taught them to disciples. These truths are not matters of speculation, inference, or faith. With few variations, the ṛṣis have known the truth as the same for all.
Philosophy is a rational exercise occupying a place between religion and science. It conforms to science.	Ṛṣis have taught them not as dogmas but through rational demonstration. Philosophy functions not to discover, but in explaining and understanding the truths already realised by experience.
Philosophy has no grand purpose towards humans reaching a greater ideal.	They all lead to the same end, absolute freedom and independence of a human.
There is no idea regarding categories of minds to explain the philosophical ideas.	Ṛṣis have taught the same truth, by three standard grades, to suit different minds and temperaments.
	These different methods of teaching constitute the three categories. They are not contradictory and together form a single and gradually advancing series. They may not be even chronological in order.

The Three Standards or Categories (Prasthāna) Of Teaching

These are:

1. The Creationist or Realistic standard
2. The Psycho-dynamic standard
3. The Polyonomic standard

The Creationist or Realistic Standard

The first standard or category is for beginners interested in the practical truths of the metaphysical philosophy. Here, the universe exists as it appears to the mind, extending in space and changing in time. It embodies realism in its purest and most basic form. This standard reduces the infinite variety of existing and experienced things to nine classes or ultimate realities. This is the Analytic Aspect of the universe.

The Synthetic Aspect of the universe explains how everything in the universe arises from these nine classes of ultimate realities. These secondary things are absolutely new creations out of eternally existing things. This is Ārambha-vāda or Asat-kārya-vāda, the doctrine of absolute non-existence of the produced before their actual production. Three main schools are concerned with dealing with this category of teaching:

1. Dharma-mīmāṃsa regarding human duties
2. Nyāya consisting of reasoning and logic to arrive at the metaphysical truths
3. Vaiśeṣika dealing with the theoretical metaphysical doctrines

The Psycho-Dynamic standard

The nine realities are reduced to only two ultimate principles forming the Analytic Aspect of the universe. The Synthetic Aspect explains how the entire universe is derived from these two ultimate Realities. One of the two classes remains forever unaffected and unchanged. The other class produces the mental (psychical), which manifests as thoughts, ideas, and feelings. The mental produces all material. Although the material appears to originate from the mind (like the equivalent “idealism” in western traditions), it is more appropriate to refer to it as psycho-dynamism.

The second reality originates both psychical (feelings, thoughts, and ideas) as well as dynamic (the nature of forces or powers). It discards the creationist notion of Vaiśeṣika, but things are already existing as a potential in the original psycho-dynamic principle. Similar to how a tree grows from a seed, things also evolve from their potential state. Thus, Pariṇāma Vāda asserts that things do not originate but rather evolve from a potential state. This is Sat-kārya-vāda. This is in contrast to the Asat-kārya-vāda of the previous category, where there is the creation of absolutely new things from an eternally existing substance.

Two schools belong to this standard.

1. Sāṃkhya
2. Yoga

Sāṃkhya explains the doctrines, and yoga shows the practical method for realising these truths.

The Polyonymic Standard

This takes off from where the previous standard stops. The two realities merge into a single reality. It does not contradict the former, but shows how one of the realities shown by the second standard cannot be absolutely real; and from a point of view, it is non-existent. This is the Analytic Aspect. The Synthetic Aspect describes how the rest of the universe is derived. The doctrine essentially holds that what is experienced as a universe is a single, uniform reality of the nature of “Pure intelligence” or “Experiencing Principle.” The single Reality is experienced as a multiplicity of names and forms (nāma and rūpa).

The creation principle here is Vivarta-vāda or Sat-kāraṇa-vāda. The names and forms are absolutely no different from the underlying single reality. The originating source is the basis of all things. Vedānta represents this standard.

PART 2

The Nine Realities

According to the Realism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there are nine fundamental realities that make up the Universe. These nine Realities are the Dravyas of Vaiśeṣika. They are also termed as “substances,” but the author says that he prefers to call them as Realities or entities. They are as shown:

Paramāṇus (Aṇu): These are of four types and are eternal and changeless without magnitude. Though they are compared to the atoms, the difference is that atoms have magnitude, but the paramāṇus of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are without any magnitude whatsoever.

Ākāśa: It is an all-pervading continuum. The loose equivalent in Western traditions is the now disbanded term Ether.

Kāla: This is a power, force, or reality that is Time bringing, changing, and destroying things. It also provides perceptions of the past, present, and future.

Dik: This Reality is a power holding things in their relative positions.

Ātmans: They are infinite in number, generally in touch with each other, and have the possibility of a relationship with everything in the universe. Each of the Ātmans is the basis for experience and consciousness.

Manas: They are also in an infinite number with no magnitude and serve as the means for the Ātman to relate to or be conscious of anything in the universe.

The Paramāṇus

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the external world is neither an illusion nor an idea of the mind. There is an independent, sensible world outside of the experiencer. The reasons for saying this are:

1. We deny the existence of things perceived in dreams because we do not see them on waking. We are certain that things exist during the waking state; and hence, it is absurd to deny their existence once again in the waking state.
2. If the sensible world did not exist, dreams would be impossible because, like memories and imaginings, they are only repetitions of things already experienced outside.
3. If the sensible world did not exist and is a product of our mind, then we could simply see them continuously at will just like our ideas.
4. There are mistaken perceptions of hallucinations that would not exist either if sensible things do not exist.

Thus, a sensible world exists, which is independent of the subjective ideas and experiences of the individual percipients. Paramāṇus, or super-sensible realities without any magnitude, compose this reality. Western realism posits that the sensible world comprises elements with both magnitude and extension. Hindu realism postulates that the paramāṇus, or the ultimate building blocks of the universe, are real or independent forces without magnitude.

Now, the sensible world has two classes: Visible and Invisible. Invisible is the vast aerial atmosphere, which contains everything else. Visible or invisible, these sensible things are discrete and are limited in extent. Regarding the invisible air, there are movements in it, like whirlwinds. This indicates that the aerial atmosphere is not an all-filling continuum, but rather consists of discrete parts. If the invisible aerial atmosphere were all-filling, non-discrete, or not composed of movable parts, there would be no commotion in it. The fact of cyclones and whirlwinds thus shows that the atmosphere is not a continuum without any movement whatsoever. Things of limited extent must also consist of parts.

Production of Discrete Things

There are three ways to produce discrete objects of limited magnitude.

1. Addition of things that have magnitude.
2. Contraction or expansion of a thing of a different magnitude
3. A number of things standing together, entering into a combination, and forming a single unit. The original parts or factors, no longer independent of the whole, need not have any magnitude.

To explain the last, the mere aggregates or secondary produced units are new and more than the sum of the components. The term “Avayavins” describes them. Sensible things of limited magnitude are never absolutely solid. They are porous because only then can transformation by other factors, like heat, occur. Thus, sensible things have ultimate parts that are not absolutely contiguous but have spaces between them.

Principles Governing the Structure of Secondary Unit or Avayavin

A number of separate things can produce a secondary unit, which is other than or different from a mere aggregate. This unification is different from a simple combination. Thus, the ultimate particles of anything stand apart from one another. These principles show how things of no magnitude can produce a single thing or a secondary unit of limited magnitude.

Nyāya postulates that the ultimate things “point” like and two in number produce a “line” of some magnitude. Three such lines can come together and form a prism in three dimensions. Thus, even without magnitude, things of magnitude can come into existence. Things like points are the simplest of factors, and these are the paramāṇus with no magnitude. These paramāṇus are eternal, unproduced, and indestructible. These paramāṇus cannot be considered to have any lines, surfaces, or volumes. They do not have length, breadth, or thickness.

Importantly, being without magnitude, they can never be perceived — supersensible or transcendental (Atīndriya). They are supersensible in the sense that they cannot be perceived with even the most sophisticated instrument. They exist beyond the reach of the senses, just as the ear can never perceive colour. Only the mind can perceive them. These paramāṇus are also non-spatial, not occupying any position (Pradeśātīta).

If there is no distinction between the four types of paramāṇus, how do we categorise them? We classify them based on the specific qualities they generate in the substances they produce. Most important in Nyāya Realism is that external things’ qualities are independent of the percipient and must be inherent in the things themselves. Perception is never a construction in the mind of the outside world. The properties are not subjective. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, any sensible thing can also be perceived by more senses than one. These are general properties of matter, or Sāmānya Guṇas. In regard to masses, they differ only in degree and not in kind. Thus, one mass is more ponderable, penetrable, softer, or harder than another.

The scientific paradigms postulate an external world where neural impulses generated when the light from the object hits the retina create an image in the brain that somehow represents the external object. According to scientific paradigms, each object in the world has two components: the noumenon, which is the original object, the true nature forever unknown to us, and the phenomenon, which is the construction in the brain. Whether the phenomenon is the true representation of the noumenon is forever beyond our comprehension because what we see is only a construction.

Special Qualities of Matter

Some sensible matter is perceived only by a single sense. They differ not in degree but in kind. They are essentially different from one another.

1. Odour perceived only by the nose.
2. Flavour perceived only by the tongue.
3. Luminosity (color) perceived by the eye.
4. Temperature or touch (sparśa) perceived by skin.

Sound is not the property of discrete, sensible things, as we shall see later. The four properties, including sound, are perceived by a single and special sense only. The four properties are essentially different from one another. They are also inherent qualities in the matter themselves, belonging to the sensible world and not the percipient. Only Idealism denies the existence of the sensible world outside the percipient’s ideas and thoughts.

With reference to the inalienable qualities, we can divide all sensible and compound matter into four great classes.

1. Temperature (or touch) essential to matter as a special quality, while the rest (odour, flavour, and colour) can be eliminated.
2. Luminosity can never be eliminated as the special quality while the others could be.
3. Flavour cannot be eliminated.
4. Odour can never be eliminated.

Compounds of succeeding classes possess the preceding qualities. The atmosphere, or pure air, is the most abundant source of the first quality, or temperature/touch. This is a class of sensible matter technically and symbolically called Vāyu. Luminosity, most abundant in the sun and stars, is technically and symbolically called Fire or Tejaḥ. Flavour of an objective thing appear only when dissolved in water, and hence the third class of compounds associated with flavour is called Water or Āpaḥ. The solid earth is a storehouse of substances associated with odour; hence, the technical and symbolic name for odour is earth or Pṛthvī.

Thus, all sensible matters are of four types:

1. Thermal matter
2. Self-luminous matter
3. Flavoury matter
4. Odoriferous matter

Hindu philosophy views them as compounded and produced forms of matter, not as primary elements as in western traditions. These extended matters, also known as bhūtas, are not considered indivisible substances, unlike the elements in western traditions.

Classification of Paramāṇus

The paramāṇus are thus classified by the nature of the matter or substances they produce, though the paramāṇus themselves are of no magnitude. Thus, there are paramāṇus producing inalienable temperature/touch, colour or luminosity, flavour, and odour, respectively. We classify them as follows based on the specific classes of sensible things they produce:

1. The Vāyu-paramāṇus which enter into the composition of the aerial atmosphere.
2. The Teja-paramāṇus which originate luminosity in all self-luminous objects.
3. The Āp-paramāṇus which originate flavour in all compounds.
4. The Pṛthvī-paramāṇus which originate odour in compounds.

The paramāṇus are similar to each other but are classified according to the matter they produce. The paramāṇus are real and self-subsisting, not originating from anything else. There are no minor subclassifications of the paramāṇus. According to Nyāya’s theory of perception, each of the four classes also produces the particular sense itself: the temperature/touch sense, sight (eyes), taste (tongue), and smell (nose). Each of the senses reveals only one single quality. And it reveals to us only that quality which it itself can produce.

An excitation of the optic nerve produces the sensation of colour, a form of luminosity produced, in fact, by the same paramāṇus that make up both the object matter and the senses. Thus, the four senses of the subject, which are related to temperature/touch, sight, taste, and smell, are made of paramāṇus producing in the sensed matter temperature/touch, luminosity, flavour, and odour, respectively. The special senses are of the same nature as the qualities themselves. They are the originators of the qualities that are perceived by means of them. Thus, in summary, paramāṇus are of four types, and they produce both the senses and the sensible matter sensed by them. In a sensible matter, one type of paramāṇu is important and is an inalienable component. The rest may be present, but they are not inalienable.

The Ākāśa

The paramāṇus produce things by standing away from each other and yet being joined by some medium, which is a non-discrete Reality or a continuum. This is ākāśa, an all-pervading Reality. A quality inheres in a discrete particular thing when it has the following characteristics:

• It endures as long as the object exists.
• It can never be separated from the thing unless the latter undergoes some radical or chemical changes.
• It reappears in any combination with other things of the thing in which it inheres.

None of these properties are good for sound. This is because sensible things can be soundless or perfectly silent. Now, there is nothing from which sound cannot be entirely eliminated. Sound produced by a thing, like the strings of a violin, is never exactly the same as the combined sounds of the parts of which the thing is composed. Yet sound must exist in some realities. It cannot be subjective. If other qualities are not inherent in the subjective being but of the objective reality, a similar case must be the case of sound.

The Reality in which sound is an inherent property is the ākāśa. Ākāśa is eternal, absolutely motionless, and super-sensible. It can never be perceived by the senses. Being all-pervading, it can never be isolated from other things so as to enable us to distinguish it from them. Though ākāśa itself is supersensible, its special property sound can be perceived by the special sense of hearing.

The sense of hearing (ear) is only ākāśa conditioned. Thus, though the ākāśa is not an extension of hearing, as with other paramāṇus, it is conditioned in particular ways by the peculiar structure of the ear. If disturbed, there may be alterations in the conditioning of the ākāśa, and hence, hearing may be affected.

Hence, finally, there are five classes of entities as ultimate realities or the ultimate constituents of the universe. They are all supersensible. Only their products are sensible. These five classes are commonly referred to as Bhūtas, or matter.

1. Pṛthvī paramāṇus or odoriferous minima.
2. Āp paramāṇus or flavour producing minima.
3. Tejaḥ paramāṇus or luminous minima.
4. Vāyu paramāṇus or thermal minima.
5. Ākāśa or ethereal continuum.

Kāla And Dik

A force can also be a Dravya if it has independent existence. All perceptible entities undergo movement, transformation, emergence, and destruction. Kāla is the force that makes possible orderly movements and seasonable origination and destruction of things. A special effect arises only when things enter into a special relationship. Only when a special relationship emerges can things influence or impact one another.

Kāla is the general principle of movement, which has a general relation to anything that moves, comes into being, changes, or passes out of existence. As it moves and changes things, it gives rise to notions of past, present, and future in the percipient. Kāla pervades the whole universe and is not dependent on anything else; everything in the universe depends on it.

Dik is the power, force, or principle of relative position that discrete objects hold. Acting in opposition to kāla, dik holds something in its position in the universe as a sensible object. Dik makes the relative positions of objects in the universe possible. It gives rise to the notions of “far and near” and directions in the percipient.

Ākāśa is different from dik. The wall where the photo hangs is the ākāśa, while the cord holding the painting is the dik. Kāla and dik are thus Realities that hold the sensible universe together in the infinite space of ākāśa, which ever moves in well-regulated and seasoned cycles and yet maintains the positional order.

The Ātman In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

Different schools have a different view on the Ātman, but all believe that it is an Independent, Eternal, and Infinite Reality at the back of every experiencing entity. The Creationist Standard defines the Ātman as a Reality that sustains consciousness or experience but does not consider it essential. In this system, Ātmans are infinite in number. In Sāṃkhya, Ātman is Feeling Intelligence itself and is infinite in number. According to Vedānta, Ātman embodies intelligence and is the same for all experiencing beings. Thus, Eternal and Infinite Ātman is the agreement of all schools.

In the Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya perspective, Ātman has Consciousness. The latter, as a property, can have no independent existence. A property must inhere in some Reality. The position that consciousness belongs to the body cannot be true because if it were a property of the body, it would exist in all its parts and ingredients, or the Bhūtas. Similarly, there is an argument that the property in combination can be more than the sum of individuals, and thus consciousness can arise from a combination of body parts. The argument also faces refutation.

Consciousness is Not the Body

If one believes consciousness is the combination of many consciousnesses, one may not feel that way about multiple body consciousnesses. If consciousness were a body property, there would be no whole-body consciousness. Consciousness cannot be an essential property of the body because then the body can never leave, and death would be impossible. An essential property is never absent from a thing.

Colour is an essential property of the body and hence stays even after its death. There is never an absolute removal of colour from the body. The same cannot be said of consciousness, however. Consciousness is accidental to the body. Consciousness implies a relation between what is conscious and that of which it is conscious. Consciousness applies only to the conscious subject and never to the object. Since one is aware of the body as a subject, consciousness is distinct from the body itself.

Consciousness causes desire or will. Will is a phase of consciousness. Will is different from that which it moves. Hence, will is different from the body itself. Will and consciousness are inseparable, and because will is different from the object, it moves; consciousness is also different from the body, which moves on the strength of the will. Will is a part of the consciousness because it does not belong to the body. Body B cannot perceive the consciousness of body A. Hence, if consciousness were a property of the body, B would also be aware of the consciousness of A. This does not happen in our experience. Hence, consciousness is separate from the body.

Consciousness finally belongs to that which makes use of the body as an instrument. Consciousness belongs to what feels itself to be the possessor of the body. Every time a human being says, “This is my body,” the possessor feels this way. The body is an object of consciousness. If consciousness were a body property, it would mean that thing had itself as its object, which would be like saying it acted on itself. This is akin to asserting that fire has the ability to consume itself.

Thus, there could be no consciousness at all in the first place if it were a property of the body. Inability to realise consciousness apart from the body does not prove that experience is a property of the body. We are not aware of its existence after the body’s death, even if it exists. Should consciousness persist after the death of the body, this implies that consciousness is separate from the body. This doubt alone is enough to prevent accepting a theory of consciousness as belonging to the body.

If it is concluded that consciousness is only when the body is present, then we might as well conclude that visual perception is a property of light because without light, we cannot perceive anything. Thus, like light in visual perception, the body is an auxiliary to consciousness. We shall see later that consciousness can exist without the body.

Hindu philosophers have treated the brain theory of consciousness; like the body, the brain is also an auxiliary of consciousness. The brain is an instrument for the manifestation of consciousness (perhaps just a properly working radio is an instrument for the manifestation of the radio waves all pervasive in the atmosphere). Consciousness is neither inherent nor a property of the brain. Consciousness is an inherent property of a Reality that exists outside of the body and the brain. This is the Ātman.

Memory and Ātman

Without an Ātman, there can be no memory. Impressions of the body are retained as a whole. The ever-changing body itself cannot possibly transmit these impressions from infancy to youth and then adulthood. The body as an organic whole is entirely different at different stages of life. One whole’s inherent impressions cannot possibly migrate into another, especially when they consist of different aggregates. Therefore, something other than the particles or the aggregate they form stores impressions. This entity is the Ātman, which connects the different organic wholes at different points in time.

If we believe memories are stored in particles, organic wholes, or something else, and if we can posit that there is nothing really beyond the body, then we can possibly argue like this. But nobody has definitively proved that there is no Ātman. In the absence of such proofs, the above style of argument amounts to dogmatic assertions only. In fact, the overwhelming weight of evidence indicates the existence of something beyond the body, possessing consciousness as its property and originating impressions. If we explain everything by the Ātman, it becomes the simplest explanation without resorting to much reasoning and dialectic. The Ātman provides a straightforward explanation for the ability to recall experiences, even when the body undergoes complete transformation.

Self-Identity and Moral Justice

The feeling of self-identity also shows the existence of the Ātman. A person feels as the human being at different stages of life. The thread that binds the different stages of human life is the Ātman, which preserves the self-identity and also carries the impressions of each stage to be carried forward. The theory of consciousness only as a function of the brain (mastiṣkātmavāda) was never propagated because the mind carries the same properties as the body, and the consciousness goes beyond both the body and the brain.

If there is no Ātman beyond the body, there could be no moral law or justice in the universe. If it is admitted that there is justice in the universe, then it will also need to be admitted that man’s consciousness is not the property of the body and that there is something else that is different from him and that is everlasting. Ātman is hence not the senses, vitality (prāna), or the mind (manas). The eyes see and the ears hear, but not the other way around. It is the Ātman who is behind both the experiencers. Hence, Ātman is not in the senses.

Senses are an instrument of an agent, and this agent is the Ātman. paramāṇus and ākāśa produce the senses, which are a part of matter. Therefore, consciousness cannot be a property of matter. Vitality is not the Ātman. Vitality cannot mean anything other than a special connection between Ātman and a certain form of matter. By this relation, Ātman builds up and organises as a means of having experience. Finally, Ātman cannot be the mind; the latter being thoughts, ideas, and feelings. Thoughts, feelings, and ideas are constantly changing. Ātman, the eternal and unchanging reality, experiences them as agents.

Being eternal, it cannot be produced or destroyed. It is also infinite, in touch with all things, or pervasive. For a thing to be eternal, either it must be without magnitude like the paramāṇus or all-pervading. Anything in between must consist of parts and hence be divisible. Anything divisible is not eternal. An infinite number of Ātmans exist, as there are and can be living entities. If these were not, then everyone would be conscious of the thoughts and feelings of everybody else.

The Manas

The Ātman does not always perceive an external object, even when it is in relation to one. The Ātman is present always, everywhere, and so is the object, and yet the Ātman does not notice the object many times. Only with the special link called Manas is a special relationship established between the Ātman and the object. The Manas can be identified by the fact that we know things in succession. The Ātman is present always, everywhere, and there is no reason it should know things in succession. Only the Manas makes it possible for the Ātman to know things in succession.

To experience thoughts, feelings, and other sensations, one also needs Manas. It is not only objects made known by sense organs that the Ātman is aware of. There are feelings of pain, pleasure, happiness, and sadness that the Ātman is conscious of. The Ātman experiences these emotions through the Manas. Recollection of things forgotten also proves the manas. An organ is necessary for both the initial understanding of these thoughts and ideas and their subsequent recall. Thoughts and ideas are sometimes known and sometimes forgotten. There is an organ without which the Ātman cannot be aware of things. This organ is the Manas.

There is only one manas in each individual. Manas is eternal, indestructible, and not produced. Being eternal, it also has no magnitude. The other eternal being, Ātman, is of infinite magnitude. Manas cannot be of infinite magnitude because, if it were, there could be no succession of perception, or forgetfulness, or calling back to memory. It has no special relationship with anything. Manas enables the Ātman to have experience, not simultaneously of all things at once but in succession. Manas moves very quickly. Otherwise, there can be no quick perception of things that appear simultaneous. Ātman is the basis of experience, whereas Manas is its instrument. There are an infinite number of Manases.

The Principles Summarised

The Realities from the Creationist or Realistic viewpoint are as follows:

(1-4): The four classes of paramāṇus. No magnitude. These realities are self-sustaining and are beyond sensory perception. These realities create forces, stimuli, or things that produce perceptible objects with unique qualities, such as temperature/touch, color, flavour, and odor.

(5) The Ākāśa, Ether, or Ethereal space. All-pervading reality. Infinite magnitude. Provides the expanse in which all things move. It functions as a bridge that connects discrete and separated entities. Additionally, it serves as the backdrop against which the tangible quality of sound inheres.

(6) Kāla, the principle of universal movement. The principle of kāla is responsible for the creation, transformation, and destruction of things. This principle gives rise to notions of the past, present, and future in the percipient.

(7) Dik, the principle, which holds things together in their various relative positions while they are being driven on by kāla. This principle gives rise to notions such as “here, there, near, and far” in the percipient.

(8) The Ātmans. The Ātmans serve as the foundation for both consciousness and experience. Eternal. Infinite. They are everywhere and touch everything, but Manas gives them special relationships with certain objects.

(9) The Manases. Each Manas is unique to the entity experiencing it. The force or power that is the direct instrument of knowledge and experience. No magnitude and non-spatial.

The 4 paramāṇus, Manases, are without magnitude, discrete, and infinite in number. ākāśa, kāla, and Dik are single Realities having a universal scope. Ātmans have a universal scope but are infinite in number.

PART 3

The Synthetic Aspect: The Doctrines

This article is the third in a series on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika – read Part 1 here and Part 2 here.

The doctrines of the creation of the universe with the nine Realities are as follows:

1. No first beginning of things.

The beginning of a universe refers solely to the creation of a system. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika posits that there is never the first or only one to exist but only one of the beginningless series. The beginningless series is saṃsāra. An absolutely first beginning can mean one of the three:

• it was the first molding of already existing ingredients
• such eternally existing entities required an intelligent being, or
• it was created out of nothing by an intelligent being.

In the first, stuff has existed forever; in the second, both the being and stuff existed forever; and in the third, it is the intelligent being that has existed forever. In any case, something had existed prior to the creation of the universe. Now, the age of the universe, however long, is limited. This beginning, however remote, is insignificant when compared to the infinite or eternal duration of the stuff, or a being called God. Thus, none of the three alternatives can be maintained as the first beginning of creation.

The first, meaning an absolute beginning, is impossible since there cannot be self-movement of inert matter. Is this moulding of stuff by God essential to God or merely accidental? In the 2nd and 3rd propositions, if essential, then it has existed eternally with God. We need to elucidate the process by which a potentiality transformed into an actuality. Creation is impossible if activity is accidental to God. There is hardly a reasonable way to show how a being perfectly satisfied without activity from all eternity could suddenly start creating a universe.

Even if we concede a sudden resolve, we cannot maintain, without contradiction, that God, who is a moral and just being, could have created a partial and suffering world. Nor is the contradiction removed if we say that God created everything equal but endowed them with a free will, which tends to give wickedness in the world. Omniscient beings know all time periods and would not create something that would have disastrous consequences if given free will.

Nothing that is created or produced can be eternal. How can God produce such everlasting souls or Ātmans? The contradictions are completely removed from an unjust and partial god if we accept that the universal manifestation never began, but it is simply an eternal process going on forever. We refer to this endless cycle of universes as saṃsāra.

2. Saṃsāra consists of various orders of experiencing beings inhabiting the sensible and super-sensible world of beings.

The sensible are obvious. But the originating sources of the sensible are the super-sensible realities themselves. In a sensible world, there are many varieties and grades of beings forming a series, of which man is the peak, having a wider range of experiences than the beings in the preceding order. However, there must be a higher being because man is limited, and he is sometimes helped out of frustrations and limitations by unseen powers. These unseen forms must exist in supersensible states of being. Thus, there are different orders of experiencing beings; man belongs to one of them.

3. A human consists of:

a body and senses that are produced from the four classes of the paramāṇus and the conditioned ākāśa,

manas, by which awareness of different things and memory are possible on the part of the Ātmans. It is eternal but without any magnitude, and

the Ātman, which is eternal and infinite.

Ātman is the experiencer, and it gains its experience through the manas. Ātman, as the real experiencer, must also be the agent of activities that are at least voluntarily performed. There are two-fold results of Ātman’s activities:

• certain tendencies, faculties, or character (saṃskāras)
• certain potentialities of relational or moral worth (adṛṣṭa).

Saṃskāra is the bent of mind due to previous impressions. A mathematician employed later in any profession would not leave the mathematical mind in the profession. This is a saṃskāra, a general memory, or a general impression of the activities despite the disappearance of the specific and the particular aspects of that experience or activity. The details of the experience, though forgotten, are not entirely lost. They can be brought back from memory. Forgetfulness of past experience does not prove its non-existence in the past. The Ātman retains these memories.

The second class of results produced by the experiences of the Ātmans are those of the adṛṣṭas. When a person is born in a particular body and a situation, there are always concepts of right conduct and wrong conduct that would promote happiness and misery in them. There are cases when he meets the consequences immediately, and sometimes there is a wait for the consequences of the conduct. Sometimes there might be instances of showing positive acts and yet with negative results. The results of our conduct — right or wrong — wait for fulfilment. The potential relations are those results that are the future possibilities in the person. The potential worth, different from the actual worth, is the adṛṣṭa of the person.

A human constantly produces by his experiences:

• saṃskāras or tendencies
• adṛṣṭa or potential worth.

The Ātman acquires them when they are in a relationship with the body. A body has a beginning, and thus the experience of the Ātman with the body through the manas also has a beginning. We call the Ātman incarnate because of its relationship to the manas and the body. The concept of the Ātman’s beginning is solely figurative. It means the beginning of the relationship between the Ātman and the body. Death of the body is death of the association of the Ātman with the body. The period during which the body lasts is the period of rebirth of Ātman in that sense.

4. The eternal Ātman of man, together with the eternal manas, which is its primary and immediate instrument of gaining experience, is born and dies not once but countless times. It has been doing this forever without a beginning, in an equally beginningless series of universes.

The adṛṣṭa and the saṃskāra of the previous incarnation determine each birth. The adṛṣṭa and saṃskāra determine

• the locality, time, environment, circumstances, and possible associations in the new birth;
• the family and parentage, the subjective aspect of his living meant by heredity; and
• the possible longevity of the body.

The saṃskāras also make up for the differences in the character of children born in the same family.

The saṃskāras show up as innate tendencies, capacities, and possibilities of character. These saṃskāras may be from a distantly previous birth and not from the previous birth. Daily activities accumulate worths and tendencies incompatible with each other in the short run. When we actualise one set, it could lead us to a rich life from birth, while another could lead us to a poor life from birth. In such cases, the actualisation waits for the right conditions, like a seed that has been sown and needs the right conditions to germinate in the future. Hence, all adṛṣṭas do not manifest at the same time. What is true of adṛṣṭas is also true for the saṃskāras.

Saṃskāras and adṛṣṭas wait for a long time before manifesting themselves in future births. However, the “subliminal self,” as used in modern psychology, remains intact. They manifest at various rebirths, with some appearing immediately in the next birth and some much later. Capacities and tendencies in a child are not “gifts” but are things acquired in the past. The above ideas constitute the ideas of “karma” and “punar janma”, rebirth.

Rebirth is an accepted doctrine in Hindus and Buddhists as a presupposition and a truth. When the individual Ātman dies with any adṛṣṭa, it must get reborn in the same state where it acquired the adṛṣṭa. Another argument states that the body of an Ātman has a beginning and an end. The Ātman is eternal. If God only associates the individual Ātman with the body once, we could accuse him of injustice. He associates one Ātman without any reason with a body where a man cannot but be happy, who is many times born in misery and surrounded by vices. Why then does God associate Ātman with different kinds of bodies? We cannot refer to this as heredity. The question is not how offspring resemble their ancestors or how they inherit their circumstances. The question is why and how a Ātman comes to associate with a family as their progeny.

The explanation that we get different bodies is that we DESERVE to inherit them. This is the result of our past worths, or the adṛṣṭas in the Ātmans. Rebirth removes the difficulties of the first and only one-birth-of-man theory. The Ātman thus is ceaselessly repeating its births in a beginningless series of Universes (saṃsāras). The Ātman’s births are completely and totally determined by what they did in their last incarnation. This includes their nature, their genes, their environment, and even how long they live. The Ātman experiences the consequences of the actions of its associated body and mind.

The objection against rebirth of multiple life theory is that we do not remember our past lives. First, the saṃskāras are actually some memories of the past actions. The adult forgets memories of even infancy. Therefore, the claim that the memory of past incarnations is absent is incorrect. A lack of memory does not mean its absence. However, a man of the highest type, a ṛṣi or a Buddha, can remember all the previous births. By rebirth, an Ātman may be born not only as a human but as sub-humans too or as superhumans in the super-sensible worlds.

Adṛṣṭas of similar types manifest in human life, but those of different types can manifest as lower or higher orders of life. A human being is in contact with not only the humans but also the whole world at all times. Hence, he gains adṛṣṭas with respect to how he behaves with the human world but also the non-human world. Even as humans, they are born of different grades depending on their adṛṣṭas.

5. A hierarchy of beings exists where the higher orders control the lower. Adṛṣṭa or worth creates this.

This gives unity to the multiplicity and infinite variety of beings. They form a system and an organic whole.

6. Ātmans create the adṛṣṭas with their own karma. The acts of experiencing beings create the universe. The universe exists for a moral purpose.

The universe exists for a moral purpose, supplying situations and spheres of influence for the experiencing beings. Joy, suffering, and sorrow are according to what the Ātman deserves by way of the adṛṣṭas. The universe is a manifestation of the potential worth of beings, shaped by the actions and experiences of Ātmans. It is created with the help of other ingredients and the powers and forces that have existed eternally.

7. The series of universes are also infinite and ever happening for the realization of the adṛṣṭa of the highest being, Brahma (not to be confused with Brahman), and the beings who have not attained the results of their karma in the present universe.

The series of universes is infinite, beginningless, and endless. The universes are alternating between phases of chaos and cosmic creations. In the process of alternation of universal energy, a period of complete explication followed by a potential phase is called kalpa. The two phases are sṛṣṭi and pralaya. Kāla, or time, urges them on in this process, and dik holds them in position in the ākāśa.

8. In this series of universes, there is absolute justice. Nothing is undeserved. This cannot be said of a universe if a god has created it for the first and only time. Ātmans are eternal. All ideas and impressions are retained and remembered by the ṛṣis.

The present and the new always replicate the past and old ways. There is nothing that is absolutely new. There is no time in the life of the universe when any phase of thought and experience is found wanting, though Ātmans of all types of thought and experience may not be found at the same time. Thus, there is no such thing as an absolute progress of things in the universe. Progress and evolution from a lower to higher stage is always with reference to individuals and groups of individuals, but never of the entirety of beings all starting at the same point from the lowest level.

9. Progress and evolution is never a blind and unaided groping.

Higher types and higher worlds are always present in the universe, although they may not always be visible to us. With their own adṛṣṭas, these are in touch with and guiding the lower beings by way of thoughts, intuitions, and sudden flashes. Ātmans in all incarnate and discarnate bodies are in touch with each other.

The history of progress is like that of a child who learns from people who know a bit more than they do. The history of the child is the assimilation on the part of the lower of the already existing thoughts, ideas, and achievements of higher beings. Knowledge comes from higher beings to lower by sensible means or as super-sensible experiences of a higher kind, which include ‘sudden flashes,’ inspirations, and ecstatic visions.

10. There is never a real beginning of any science or philosophy.

Some being or beings in the beginningless series of universes have always known

• true nature of things and
• proper conduct.

It is this two-fold knowledge of things in their reality and the rules of proper conduct that is the Veda. It has always been directly known and realised by some beings, either in its entirety or in part.

These beings are the ṛṣis — humans and superhumans of various grades. Ṛṣis have been perfect and imperfect. All classes have existed from the beginning, and the perfected ṛṣis, eternally existing, have taught men that aspect of the Veda, which lifts the latter from a lower state of existence to the higher.

The communicated knowledge of the rules and principles of conduct must be different in different cases according to the various natures and the circumstances of the persons taught. We refer to this as the varṇāśrama dharma, or simply dharma. This dharma may or may not be followed, and accordingly, humans rise or fall on the scale of beings depending on the adṛṣṭas they accumulate.

11. There is a constant rise and fall in states. In a higher rise, after the accumulated karma is over, the position gained is also lost.

Existence in any of the rungs of existence is never permanent, and man can never have abiding peace and happiness.

12. There is only one way out of the suffering of multiple births. The real independence and freedom from all grades of existence is mukti, mokṣa. Freedom can only be had if the Ātman is freed from any kind of activity or karma.

This freedom happens by the realization of the truth or the true nature of things by direct experience. How is the human being going to free himself? This cannot be achieved by ceasing all work and sitting idle, as this would be inconsistent with his specific duties of varna and dharma. Not doing dharma would lead to a lower adṛṣṭa and a lower type of birth. The realization of truth as a direct experience is the only way man can stop the adṛṣṭas from happening and leading to repeated births. Even action for oneself or one’s country leads to adṛṣṭa and not mukti. Activities for pleasure or desire for good things and activities to avoid pain and suffering beget adṛṣṭas and are rooted in ignorance. Realising true nature through direct experience of the formless and shapeless paramāṇus results in the abolishment of ignorance.

Similarly, when ignorance that the Ātman is the body is broken, the seeking of embodiments by the Ātman, to the advantage of oneself or disadvantage of others, disappears. A man who has realised that he is the Ātman, not the body, can never work to advantage himself in opposition to others. All Ātmans are alike. He cannot work solely to uplift a specific nation or land. All races are his. Motives for work cease, and this desireless action leads to the realization of the Ātman as the true reality and the embodiment as only an ignorance. With the ceasing of ignorance, both with the nature of things and in regard to the Ātman, all causes of birth are removed, and the Ātman becomes totally free.

13. A human seeks wisdom when the being is really tired of a specific form of existence as a deep-rooted saṃskāra.

Realised ṛṣis have also existed eternally, and they teach the worthy candidates to become truly free. Like the eternal Veda, the line of teachers and pupils has continued to date.

14. Pupils have learnt and realised mutki by following a definite method of three steps: śravaṇa (hearing), manana (reasoning), nidhidhyāsana or direct experience of the truth.

The first step consists of hearing the truths, like that kāla and dik exist, that Ātman is eternal, and so on. The second step involves reaching rational conclusions after assessing all the arguments, both for and against. The ṛṣis come to the aid of the person by showing the line of reasoning. Thus, ṛṣis Kāṇaḍa and Gautama taught the lines of reasoning to the worthy pupils with their philosophies of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya respectively.

Philosophy is not reasoning and speculation with a view to discover metaphysical truths, but it is reasoning with a view to logically demonstrate and understand these truths, which are already given as facts of experience and as propositions enunciated in the words of the Veda.

Reasoning and speculation about transcendental truths, not already given as experienced truths, lead us only to a probability. What one establishes today, another demolishes the next day.

Mere reasoning cannot lead us to certainty regarding metaphysical truths. Reasoning is only a means to discover them. Therefore, in Hindu traditions, this type of reasoning is known as darśana, serving as a tool to uncover pre-existing and articulated truths. The object is not the performance of intellectual gymnastics but to aid the suffering man in understanding truth and becoming free of sorrows and suffering. Philosophy is not a dry intellectual exercise but of supreme practical value.

The third and final step is realization by direct experience, also called samādhi or yoga. The first is faith; the second is rational conviction, and the third is direct realization. The first two are akin to theoretical knowledge and indirect knowledge, which do not end suffering. With yoga, we pass beyond the limits of philosophy proper. Hence, philosophy is only the means to reach the highest truths, which would permanently end our suffering.

Main Principles Of Yoga

Greater attention to a thing brings more awareness of the object. This is true for physical objects, of which we are all aware. This is not so obvious for mental things. However, this is evident in many practical situations, such as solving puzzles or comprehending various subjects. Concentrating minds on different mental things in a one-pointed manner can thus lead to the acquisition of knowledge. The world amply demonstrates this.

Manas (mind) is the direct and immediate instrument of all experience and awareness. The senses assist in this operation. Indian philosophers say that the manas can gain knowledge even without the senses. Though the West is vaguely aware of this through phenomena like telepathy or hypnotism, the Indian philosophers take this as an elementary phenomenon. The manas can acquire knowledge about both physical and mental things without the aid of the senses. Both Buddhists and Hindus devoted themselves to concentrating the mind to absolute perfection, and such a perfected manas can lead to the real truth of the world and the true nature of man. The direct experience of the truth through a perfected concentration is called samādhi or yoga. Perfect concentration is akin to the unwavering light in a storm, exhibiting no flicker. It is a mind that is a combination of keenness and stillness both.

It is definitely not a state of a dead, dull stone. Hence, this cannot be achieved by staying in a dull state of zero activity. It is not idleness. The practice of yoga quietens the heart but sharpens the mental faculties. Only exercise, such as thinking through many deep problems or engaging in focused thought, sharpens the mental faculties. Thoughtfulness is the key to exercising the mental faculties.

Yoga cannot be achieved by leading a selfish life where the ego, or ahaṃkāra, remains intact for personal desires and possessions. To have calmness and keenness, an aspirant conducts his life with certain guidelines. Lack of selfishness is one. Desireless performance of duties is another. Excessive involvement in the work even after the person is off work is also not desirable. There should be no thought of personal gain and feelings of “I” and “mine.” The heart is filled with calm and is free from passions. Thus, by fulfilling his duty without ahaṃkāra and avoiding excessive entanglement, a human develops the two opposing qualities of keenness and calmness.

Keenness with selfishness and calmness without keenness (dullness and stupidity) does not work. This is precisely Karma Yoga that involves leading an active life, fulfilling duties without entanglement, and avoiding selfish motives that stem from the ego. This is the foundation of yoga. When done to a large extent, a man is fit for practical concentration. Once the basis is firm and moral perfection manifests itself, secondary aids come into play. The regulation of diet plays a crucial role in maintaining perfect health. Diet should not evoke feelings of dullness, stupidity, heaviness, or excessive restlessness. There should be occasional periods of seclusion to practice concentration. When the mind fully focuses on a thought, several realizations occur:

1. That things consist of paramāṇus, and he will know them by means of the mind.
2. That ākāśa and other realities exist. He will become aware of them similarly.
3. That the Ātman is different from the body. Separating the mind from the body will bring this realization. With this, he will come to experience things without means of the body.
4. That man is born and dies repeatedly. He will remember his past lives. He comes to realise all the previous adṛṣṭas. He comes to exhaust all the adṛṣṭas and end the cycle of repeated births after he realises the Yogi state.
5. That there are worlds and beings that are never perceived by the senses. He becomes aware of them.
6. Finally, he identifies as the Ātman and realises that he is eternally free from the mind and the body and becomes liberated. This is the third step in acquiring and realising philosophical truths. When following yoga, the third step is absent in Western philosophy. The learner realises the truth through direct experience and becomes ṛṣi, a free man and teacher.

The goal of all Indian darṣanas (except the Cārvāka darśana), and especially the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is the absolute freedom and independence of the real in human. The being is free from every necessity and compulsion to be born in a specific form of existence. This knowledge can be gained without knowing secondary things about the nature of paramāṇus, ākāśa, Ātman, and so on. The human simply needs to be free of likes and dislikes, attachments, and aversions. At a certain stage, there is a realization that all things — the good, the bad, the ugly, the desirable, and the undesirable — are made up of the same paramāṇus and are all alike.

Once one realises that these are all paramāṇus, it matters little whether the individual knows them further as eternally existing or as derived things. By realising oneself as the Ātman, one does not need to enquire further whether there are others too. The individual being will identify with all Ātmans as being of the same essence, and will not associate with any individual adṛṣṭas or embodiments.

PART 4

Ontology and Perception of Reality in Indian Philosophies

The Nyāya theory of perception is based on the principle of contact between the subject and object in which there is no chance of the reality of the world becoming ‘naïve.’ Nor does the Nyāya theory allow for the world to transform into something other than what is observed. Therefore, the application of the term ‘Naïve Realism’ to Nyāya betrays a lack of knowledge of Nyāya.

There is a distinct mark of the prameya, or object, in traditional Indian philosophies that is missing in science and Western philosophy. This mark is the mark of ‘being seen’ or the mark of ‘knowableness.’ This point is so vital that failing to recognise it is likely to lead us to a position where we would not be speaking Indian philosophy at all. The mark of ‘being seen’ is a mark of prakṛti.

This feature of objects being ‘the seen’ finds expression in the philosophical tenet that there is a contact between the seer and the seen object — sannikṛṣṇa. The form that the (reflected) consciousness of the seer assumes in seeing the object is ‘vṛtti.’ Thus, the entire world, directly seen ‘as it is,’ has no extraneous mediating factor between the seer and the seen.

What is the ‘nature of the world’ as it appears through the theories of science? First of all, there is no distinct thing in science called ‘the seer.’. Secondly, science postulates an elaborate mechanism by which perceptions of objects occur. So, signals from the object reach the body’s sensory organs. These signals are changed into electro-neural signals, which are sent to the brain through different sensory channels. The brain then processes these signals to produce outputs in the form of images of the objects in the world. Thus, by the very nature of this postulated mechanism, the things seen are images and not the objects themselves.

We have no means by which we may verify that these images actually possess the same forms as the forms of objects in the world. In other words, every attempt to see them brings to us images rather than the object as it is. Therefore, those who hold on to such a belief, i.e., the belief that what we see is the real world, are Naïve Realists. And the philosophy that holds the perceived world to be the real despite the transformation of real world into images by the brain is ‘Naïve Realism.’

Then there are those philosophers who conclude that these images are nothing more than productions of the mind, mere ideas, or ideations of the mind. The crux of their arguments is that there can be no means to know whether there are real objects in the world, given that the things we experience arise in our minds and are contained in the mind. This is a philosophical position termed ‘idealism.’.

Traditional Indian philosophies say that the thing one knows is not just a representation of something else that might be the real thing (like in science), nor is it something less than what it seems to be (like an idea in your mind). An object is that which stands to consciousness in the cognitive act of perception. The world in Indian philosophy is not the world of Naïve Realism nor is it the ideated world of Idealism. If we must find a name for it, it may be the world of Direct Realism – a world as it presents itself directly to Consciousness.

In Indian tradition, the attributes perceived of objects, such as color and taste, are not subjective qualities, but are objective qualities inhering in the objects themselves.

This is in sharp contrast to the viewpoint of contemporary Western tradition, wherein they are subjective phenomenal qualities. In the Indian theory of perception, there is no transformation of the object in the process of presentation. The mind and sense organs contact the object and assume the form of the object by forming a vṛtti. There is thus a conjunction of the mind, the sense organ, and the object at the very location of the object. Nothing would stand between the self and the object to prevent the self’s conscious luminosity from revealing the true form of the object.

The contingency of the mind and sense organs as distorting filters arises only when they have a defect hindering them from assuming the form of the object. In the absence of sense organ or mind defects, there is nothing between the self and the object to prevent perception from revealing the object clearly. The perception of an object is based on its actual spatial location.

For touch, taste, and smell, the (subtle) organs stay inside the body, so the perception happens where the physical sense organs are when the object touches the physical sense organs of the gross body. For hearing and seeing, on the other hand, the indriyas leave the body to contact the object in space outside of the body.

While there are minor variations between the darśanas about the technicalities of perception, all the darśanas hold that perception takes place due to the contact of the (subtle) sense organs with the object. There is uniformity regarding perception being direct and revealing the object in its actual form through the contact of the consciousness with the object through the instrumentality of the sense organs and mind. Such contact is instantaneous since the consciousness that appears within the body is the same Consciousness that exists without the limiting adjuncts of the body, and which is in conjunction with all objects. Hence, perception is nothing more than the removal of the covering of maya over the individual consciousness to reveal the conjunction that already exists with the object.

The Lost Ark of The Categories

Nyāya studies philosophy under sixteen categories (padārthas), which includes objects for knowledge (prameyas), the means for knowledge (pramāṇas), and the purpose of such knowledge. Thus, the Nyāya system studies:

1. the Self
2. the body
3. the senses
4. the objects of the senses
5. the mind, knowledge, and activity
6. mental imperfections
7. rebirth
8. pleasure and suffering
9. freedom from suffering
10. substance (dravya)
11. quality (guṇa)
12. motions (karma)
13. universals (sāmānya)
14. particulars (viśeṣa)
15. inherence (samavaya)
16. non-existence (abhava)

According to Nyāya Shastra, the prameyas, or objects of knowledge, are of last seven of the above: dravya (substance), guṇa (quality), karma (action), sāmānya (universal), viśeṣa (particular), samavaya (inherence), and abhava (non-existence). Scholastic philosophy included a study of such objects. But today, both in the East and in the West, there is an effacement of such ideas. Vedānta accepts the categories of Nyāya except for the category called ‘inherence’.

Vaiśeṣika has a central tenet of particulars (vaiśeṣas) constituting all of existence, out of which some are atomic, and some are non-atomic. Vaiśeṣika, as a philosophy for ontology (explanation of universe), is pluralistic realism. Pluralism, because it holds the universe consisting of a combination of a variety and diversity of irreducible elements. Realism, because it holds reality as independent of our perceptions. Vaiśeṣika recognizes seven padārthas or categories (included in the sixteen of Nyāya) to comprehend the objects making up the world.

Scientists have discarded the idea of ‘substance’ after looking for it for many decades. However, one cannot find ‘substance’ even after looking for it for a million years, says Chittaranjan Naik. It appears in the original moment of cognition by an apperception that recognizes substance as the grounding factor of the objects we perceive in the world. Apperception is the process whereby perceived qualities of an object are related to past experience. (Example: “There’s X” is a perception, but “X is my friend” becomes an apperception). Substance, in its capacity as pure substance, is never naked without attributes. That ‘something’ which the attributes describe (as the nature of the existing thing) is substance. The intrinsic characteristic of a substance is ‘existence’. And because a substance is an existing thing with various attributes, it is a unity that binds these various attributes into one single unitary existing thing.

The case with universals is similar. One cannot find universals by looking for them. Anything one can look at, think of, or conceive is a ‘particular’. Universals do not exist in the world. They do not exist in thought. They are not spatio-temporal things. Universals are meanings that exist in the Self, and which form the basis of sākṣī-pramāṇa in the act of recognition (pratyabhijñā). In the West, there has been a two-thousand-year war between the Realists (Platonists) and the Nominalists over the question of the existence of universals. Theaetetus of Plato answers it – universals are ‘stamps of truth in Being’. The ‘ideal red’ or the ‘ideal circle’ of Plato is not something found by itself in the world. The world in Plato is a world of shadows, and the ideal world is elsewhere – it is the stamp of truth in the Numinous Ground of Being.

These symbols – substance, attributes, universals, particulars, etc. – were used to evoke meanings in the minds of the people of Europe until the end of the medieval era. The Ark of the Categories passed on from generation to generation by the traditions of scholastic philosophy, but it disappeared in the post-Descartian period when Science and British Empiricism brought about a new age.

Padārthas: Words and Objects

A soul that looks at the world through virginal eyes, unclothed by the webs of extraneous theories, sees the categories. Socrates had said that a thing is red in color for no other reason except for the participation of ‘ideal redness’ in the thing. This is the fundamental ground on which logic stands – that a thing is what it is due to itself and not on account of another. The categories are the fundamental stuff – the ancient and timeless Logos – which makes the universe. Everything that we see around us is nāma rūpa (name and form).

Name and form are synonymous with word and object, and the term ‘padārtha’ derives from the two words – pada (word) and artha (object). Padārthas are the building blocks that go into the foundational structure of the universe, made of name and form. The padārthas are to be known by turning our attention to the acts of cognition of the objects rather than by the construction of theories built on the unexamined structure of the elements that lie in the acts of cognition. These padārthas are constituents of the vṛtti when the mind and senses conform to the form of the object; one cannot find them by looking for them outside after the vṛtti forms. The act of looking makes the senses and mind conform to different kinds of objects through different kinds of vṛttis. And this brings us to a fundamental difference between science and Indian Traditional Philosophy.

Indian traditional philosophy strives to reveal the nature of objects. Science seeks to construct theories to explain the nature of objects. The former grounds in revealing; the latter in theory construction. The difference between the two stems from a fundamental difference in their attitudes toward knowledge. In Indian traditional philosophies, one seeks knowledge from within. In science, one seeks knowledge from outside. There exists an almost unbridgeable gulf between contemporary science and traditional Indian philosophies.

Logic

Modern logic is accurate only within the confines of mathematics. In A=B, A and B are variables that, in formal logical systems, apply to numerous objects in the world without regard to their type or nature. Modern logic does not acknowledge that the name ‘logic’ derives from the Greek ‘logos,’ which means ‘word,’ and that the intrinsic relationships between word-objects must determine logic’s operations. Analytical philosophy (or modern symbolic logic) sought but failed to do so. Vaidika metaphysics and epistemology provide a more pure and pristine form of logic.

According to the Vedas, this world is nāma-rūpa (name-form). Name is pada or word. Form is artha or object. Therefore nāma-rūpa, the nature of the world, is pada-artha, or word-objects. The study of padārtha is Nyāya shastra or logic. Nyāya is an upāṅga or or Vedāṅga, a subsidiary arm of the Vedas. Nyāya, unlike modern logic, does not accept a pure logic abstracted from the applied things. All rules of logic are the structural schemata of the objects themselves. And because the world is nāma-rūpa, or word-object, grammar, the relational structure of words, mirrors the relational structure of the objects in the world. There is thus no difference between the structural schema of the world and the structural schema of language because they are not two disparate things, but two aspects of one structure mirroring each other. Wittgenstein was one of the rare Western philosophers who had a glimpse of this truth.

Sameness and Difference

Differences in attributes do not necessarily make things different. An apple may be red or green, sweet, or tasteless, large, or small, but they are all apples. It is important to discern in what sense “sameness” exists amidst the variety and differences. “He is that same Devadatta,” asserts the sameness of the person, Devadatta, at different times and different places. Despite everything in the river water changing the next day, one says “it is the same river.”

Sameness and difference of things in Indian logic is in the light of the natures of sāmānya and viśeṣa (universal and particular); and dravya and guṇa (substance and attribute). Sameness is by sāmānya (universal) where the fundamental truth of a thing is that it is same with itself by virtue of its nature. A red thing is red not because of some other thing, but because of its redness. Thus, when sameness is in two different things, it is not due to any other reason than that the sāmānya of the attribute is present in both.

However, when we speak of the sameness of a single entity (such as a person or a river at different times), we are referring to the unitary existence of a thing’s multiple attributes- the substance (dravya). What we see as an existent entity is a substance, which has a variety of qualities in a single unitary existence. Now, the identity of a thing (substance) is derived not from the individual traits that characterise it, nor from the combination of these attributes, but from the sāmānya (universal) that identifies it. That is, an apple does not derive its identity as an apple by the redness, or the roundness, or the sweet taste, that describes it, nor by a combination of these attributes, but by the sāmānya that identifies it, namely “appleness.” Therefore, when we speak of substantial things, the sāmānya of the thing comprises a multitude of attributes within it without detriment to its unity.

Sāmānya presents itself to cognition as a particular instance of its manifestation. The manifestation of the universal (sāmānya) is therefore always a particular (viśeṣa). A specific is never existentially distinct from the sāmānya. Thus, there arises the hierarchy of genera and species as particulars of the universal and from which they are never different. All flowers are flowers due to the “flowerness” in them, even though a rose and a lotus are different from each other as particular kinds of flowers. In the act of perception, the natures of grasping “substances” and “universals” are in the stillness of perception. That stillness is the disassociation of the witness from the things he witnesses. Nyāya is a cleansing of the intellect so that it may sink back into its source, the heart, from which it sees the truth. In the philosophy of Nyāya, this is niḥśreyasa.

Now, two things may have the same attribute even though they may be essentially different, i.e., an apple and a table may both be red, but they are entirely different. When two things are the same essentially (in substance), then it is the sameness of essence even though there may be differences in the attributes that inhere in them, i.e., two tables are the same essentially even though one may be red and the other white.

Indian Logic And Contemporary Logic In The Understanding Of Reality

Aristotle enumerated the categories- the most general kinds, into which entities in the world divide. The following are the highest ten categories of things that exist ‘without any combination.’

1. Substance (e.g., man, horse)
2. Quantity (e.g., four-foot, five-foot)
3. Quality (e.g., white, grammatical)
4. Relation (e.g., double, half)
5. Place (e.g., in the marketplace)
6. Date (e.g., yesterday, last year)
7. Posture (e.g., is lying, is sitting)
8. State (e.g., has shoes on, has armour on)
9. Action (e.g., cutting, burning)
10. Passion (e.g., being cut, being burned)

There are two sorts of substance: a primary substance is, for example, an individual man or horse; the secondary substances are the species (and genera) of these individuals (e.g., man, animal). While all the ten categories are all equally highest kinds, primary substances have a priority since without them the others do not exist.

Aristotle apparently arrived at his list by distinguishing “different questions which may be asked about something” and noting “that only a limited range of answers can be appropriately given to any particular question”. A categorial realist approach provides the most general sort of answer to questions of the form “What is this?” and providing for narrower definitions and distinguishing from other things in the same category. Scholastic philosophy too used the categories in its arguments of logic. Categories defined the legitimate ways in which we may speak about objects.

In the Post-Cartesian period, however, when the very existence of external objects became doubtful by an Indirect Realism, categories as descriptions of the world objects lost their legitimacy. Contemporary philosophers have done away with the categories, the basic constitutive elements of objects. With the development of modern science and philosophy, scientists and philosophers sacked and destroyed the categories of the logoi, which had once been the stable ground for philosophy. Science had no use for the categories. Philosophy, following the scientific paradigms, rejected the categories. Berkeley, Hume, and Nietzsche completely buried the categories in their writings.

Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, did restore some of the respect accorded to the categories but scientists were not much concerned with his ideas because what mattered to scientists was that the theories they constructed worked rather than that the philosophical justifications that made the principles they used possible. Naik jī asks, “What was the ground on which the categories became mere products of the fertile imagination? Was the inability to perceive an entity by itself an enough ground for its denial? This is a crucial point, but one which may not be obvious to a philosopher from the Western tradition because Western philosophy has never treated non-existence as an independent category.”

But Indian logic has; and it has also provided the epistemic means to ascertain the non-existence of an object. In Indian logic, the mere absence of perception of an object is, by itself, an insufficient ground for denying the existence of the object. It needs another condition called the pratiyogin – its amenability to perception under the given condition. To declare that an object is non-existent on the ground of it being unperceived, it must have a prior possibility of perception if it were to exist.

A chair in front of me has the possibility of perception if it were to exist. The non-perception of a chair in front of me is a justifiable reason for me to claim that it is non-existent. But I cannot justifiably claim that a chair in the next room is non-existent on the ground that I do not perceive it because even if the chair were to be existent in the next room, the wall of the room would prevent me from perceiving it. Thus, to repeat, the claim of the non-existence of an object should therefore be based on the prior possibility of perception if it were to be existent. The capacity of perception if it were to exist is ‘pratiyogin’. And the means of obtaining knowledge of non-existence based on non-perception is ‘anupalabdi’. In western traditions, the non-perception of the soul simply translates into non-existence.

As shown in ‘Natural Realism and Contact Theory of Perception’, in a veridical perception, the perception of the world and its objects are direct and transparent. Indian logic, which accepts perception as the first of the means of right knowledge (pramāṇa), does not have the problems faced by the western traditions. In the latter, its locutions of the world divide into locutions of subjective phenomenal features of objects and locutions of external objects that cannot be known (noumenon) by first-hand experience. In Indian logic, there is no such division, and one may legitimately speak about the perceived world as the real world.

There is thus no legitimate reason in Indian logic to dispense with the categories; rather, they form the bedrock of logic. The categories or padārthas as they are known in the Indian tradition are the irreducible word-objects that logically constitute the individual objects of the world, and they are held to be seven in number as seen before. The predominant form of contemporary logic is formal logic in which it is the syntactical form (the proper construction) of the argument that determines validity rather than the semantic content (the meaning) of the argument (as in Indian logic).

In contemporary formal Logic, the goal is not truth; it is the preservation of truth-values from the parts to the whole. The goal of Indian Logic, on the other hand, is towards the right cognition of objects (yathārtha-jñāna) that linguistic expressions purport to speak about.  Contemporary logic, standing on the topic-neutrality of logic, keeps itself free from ontology (the reality). Nyāya, or Indian Logic, rejects this hypothesis and holds that reasoning is impossible in the absence of knowledge of the padārthas or word-objects.

The padārthas are the generality (equivalent to the categories of Aristotle) present in the objects themselves in the form of the basic irreducible elements that linguistic expressions point to. The explicit knowledge of the padārthas- padārtha-tattva-jnana (the knowledge of the categories as principles) is mandatory to prevent fallacious reasoning. Nyāya, or Indian logic, based on the padārthas – the most fundamental set of word-objects, thus obtains a sweeping universality lending to it the power to conduct discourses on every topic of human interest that language can express.

Pramāṇas – The Means of Obtaining Right Knowledge

Any knowledge must have certain ‘means’ of acquiring it. Pramāṇa (proof or a valid ‘means of true knowledge’) plays an important role in Indian philosophical traditions. Ancient texts identify six pramāṇas whose variable acceptance and rejection form a basis for classifying the thought systems. These are:

1. Perception or direct sensory experience (pratyakṣa)
2. Inference (anumāna)
3. Testimony of reliable authorities (śabda)
4. Comparison and analogy (upamāna)
5. Postulation and derivation from circumstances (arthāpatti)
6. Non-perceptive negative proof (anupalabdhi).

In its classical form, Nyāya accepted four sources of valid knowledge (perception, inference, comparison, and testimony); the Vaiśeṣika, only two (perception and inference).

Materialism (Lokāyata or Cārvāka) holds only perception as a valid pramāṇa; Buddhism: perception and inference; and Jainism: perception, inference, and testimony. Mīmāṃsa and Advaita Vedānta hold all six as useful means to knowledge.

There are three primary pramāṇas or means of obtaining knowledge in the Indian tradition. They are perception (pratyakṣa), inferential reasoning (anumāna) and verbal testimony (śabda). These three are common to all the traditional schools of philosophy but individual schools have slight variations. Advaita Vedānta has six which also includes presumption (arthāpatti), comparison (upamāna) and non-apprehension (anupalabdi) as valid means of obtaining knowledge.

Pratyakṣa (Perception)

It is the Jyeṣṭha pramāṇa, the eldest as well the foremost. If we do not allow perception as the most fundamental means of obtaining knowledge, what is one left with to confirm the object in the world. Western philosophy has rejected perception as a valid means of knowledge, and this has played havoc with their understanding of the world. If whatever one sees or perceives is a reconstruction in the brain, what is the actual reality of the world and what is the true status of the objects uncolored by the brain?

Anumāna (Inferential Reasoning)

Inferential reasoning is the means to perceive an obstructed thing which has been previously perceived. Inferential reasoning is based on the invariable concomitance established from prior perceptions and it cannot be used to infer the presence of non-sensorial objects. Hence, inferential reasoning, by itself, cannot therefore be used to obtain knowledge of the higher truths of philosophy.

Inferential reasoning lies at the heart of debate in accordance with human reason. In the science of Indian Logic, that is, Nyāya Śāstra, discourse is tarka and the science of logic as Tarka Śāstra. The discourse has to be guided by the pramāṇas, the legitimate means of obtaining knowledge. In the Indian tradition, there is no divorce between logic and epistemology; they are parts of one integral science of discourse. This is unlike western traditions where logic is connected more with the logical progress of arguments from the premises to the conclusions unconnected to the knowledge generated regarding the objects of the world. Inferential reasoning is ordinarily restricted to reasoning about objects that belong to the domain of the senses. However, it is an indispensable tool for knowledge of higher truths as an auxiliary to the primary pramāṇa, śabda.

Śabda (Verbal Testimony)

The third of the three primary means of obtaining knowledge is śabda, verbal testimony. Śabda is the last and the highest of the three primary pramāṇas regarding the higher truths of reality beyond the senses. The characteristic mark of verbal testimony is trustworthiness. The source of trustworthy verbal testimony is called an apta. Śabda can be pauruṣeya or apauruṣeya, of human or non-human origins. Verbal testimony can refer to knowledge obtained regarding objects of the world, but it specially refers to knowledge of things beyond the senses (indriyas).

The notion of a verbal testimony that does not originate in a person is entirely alien to the tradition of Western philosophy. The Vedas are considered to be Apauruṣeyatva. This does not mean that the human author is not known. This term implies that the Vedas have no human author, as Śrī Chittaranjan Naik discusses in his essay, “Apaurusheyatva of the Vedas.” But the idea of apauruṣeyatva is not as strange as it may at first seem. The idea that a linguistic expression can exist only when it has a human author is based on the unexamined idea that the human bodily apparatus is a necessary ground for words to reside in or to become manifest in the form of speech. It is only when the human body is enlivened with consciousness that the human being can think or speak. Indian philosophies argue that it is the presence of the consciousness in the human body which serves as the substratum for words to reside in as well as to provide the sentient motive force for words to be articulated as speech. The identity of language and consciousness is a recurrent theme in the philosophy of the Grammarians of India, the most notable among them being Bhartṛhari.

The repository of words in a human being is not the body but is the consciousness that inhabits the body. But since the consciousness that inhabits the body is that very same Consciousness that eternally exists as the Ground of the universe, the repository of words would never be absent even if all mortal beings should be absent. Words reside and arise in the form of speech in the Universal Consciousness which is eternally existent.

Mīmāṃsa philosophers show that śabda is eternal and uncreated. The musical note exists in the string of the veena as the struck note when it is sounding and as the unstruck note when it is not sounding. Words are similar to this in nature – they remain unstruck when they are not spoken, and they manifest as audible speech when they are struck. And when they are not manifest, they remain in identity with Consciousness, the Ground of the Universe. The unstruck sound is called ‘anāhata’. In the Indian tradition, the Vedas are held to be apauruṣeya. The Vaidika sentences are therefore regarded as the trustworthy sources of knowledge about reality. Being unauthored by human beings, they are free from the kinds of defects that human compositions are afflicted with. In the philosophy of Vedānta, the Vaidika word is the Word through which the universe is created; that is, it is the semantics of the Vaidika sentences that have become manifest as the universe.

They therefore serve as the reliable sources of knowledge not only of the philosophies but of all the fundamental disciplines of knowledge. The four Vedas together indeed constitute the one source from which all the traditional philosophies and sciences and arts of India have originated. If therefore one does not get to appreciate this nature of the Vedas and the place they hold in Indian culture, it would be a futile task to attempt to gain an understanding of either Indian philosophies or Indian culture. Indeed, in Indian culture, the terms theist and atheist are not applied to philosophies depending on their acceptance or non-acceptance of God but on their acceptance or non-acceptance of the Vedas as the Supreme Verbal Authority.

Concluding Remarks

The phenomenal beauty of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika thought in explaining the reality of the world around us remains hidden from all educational curriculums. The first principles of ontology and epistemology has far more explanatory power than Western traditions, which seem stuck at a certain point. The Indirect Realism of scientific materialism makes the original “noumenon” forever beyond the comprehension of our consciousness. Similarly, the Justified True Belief definition of knowledge ends up having many deficiencies which the Gettier examples demonstrate. The core of all our texts and shastras, and the crux around which our scientific achievements stand is Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Vedānta is for the highest seekers, and it is Nyāya, the queen of the darśanas with its clear ideas on logic, reasoning, and debate, to form the basis of the world appearing to us in a direct manner.

But Advaita Says, “Nothing is Real” and critics project a world denying philosophy of India. Chittaranjan Naik jī points that the locution of jagan-mithyā that arises in Advaita Vedānta is always in coordination with the locution of brahma-satya so that the complete expression is brahma-satya, jagan mithyā. Advaita Vedānta is Parā Vidyā; its subject matter is Brahman and not the world. In Advaita therefore jagan-mithyā is not an isolated proposition but always in coordination with brahma-satya.

But when the world has a discussion within a specific context that excludes Brahman, then, in such a context, the world is satya. This is because the world is no other than Brahman and to deny the satya of the world when the context of the discussion has excluded Brahman reduces to a kind of Nihilism. It is for this reason alone that when Shankaracharya goes about refuting Vijñānavāda and other Idealist schools of Buddhism that deny the existence of Brahman, he takes the position that the world is real. This is a vital point often overlooked by both critics of Indian philosophy and the modern proponents of Advaita Vedānta.

Science is going deeper and deeper into matter to understand the world. The quantum world seems to be the ultimate building matter presently. Still deeper are the theorized “strings” but the latter are beyond the scope of any experimental proof. They exist as mathematical identities explaining away many problems of quantum theory. Indian darśanas have the Self as the first principle starting from the other end. It is an inside-to-outside explanation while western traditions take an outside-to-inside perspective in understanding matter, life, mind, and consciousness.

However, as Mrittunjoy Guha Majumdar wonderfully demonstrates in his recent book, quantum physics collapses into the regular physical world where all the ordinary classical laws of physics apply through a mechanism called decoherence. Also, the phenomenon of entanglement and the role of observer in collapsing the quantum world into a physical world has close similarities to the interconnectedness and the single Consciousness postulated in Indian traditions. Fritzof Capra had similarly discussed the close parallels between Eastern and Western thoughts in classic book, The Tao of Physics. Mazumdar shows how the two extremes meet when concepts of the quantum world merge into metaphysical concepts of the Indian traditions. Swami Vivekananda was prescient when he declared in the last decade of the 19^th century that science in its distant future must one day meet Vedānta, the principles of which have stood rock like without change and without needing to adapt to any modern understandings for at least two thousand years.

The important thing is to realize that though the first principles appear to emerge from two opposite ends of the spectrum, they both converge on the ordinary physical world and assess the world of matter and forces acting on them in a similar manner. Hence, Vaiśeṣika can talk about gravity, planetary motions, laws of motion many centuries before Newton himself. Similarly, a different principle of ontology and epistemology did not prevent ancient Indians from having a huge output in mathematics, astronomy, architecture, geometry, agriculture, metallurgy, civil engineering, sanitation, biological sciences, vaccination, surgery, and so on apart from its rich literature. The performative ability and the ability to do science and technology remained at high levels in ancient India.

A colonial consciousness today accepts the story of primitive India before the colonials came and also believe that teaching the rich Indian philosophy in schools would go against the principles of secularism. The apparent pushing of Indian darśanas to the field of religion has been the greatest intellectual suicide of modern India. This is a major reason for the widespread deracination and derooting we are seeing in India today especially amongst the urban elite, exclusive products of an English language education. This series hopes to stimulate the readers to delve into the rich cultural and intellectual traditions of India. We need a sense of pride in our wonderful culture based on genuine knowledge for the sake of our future.

Further Readings and Selected References

1. The Hindu Realism: Being an Introduction to the Meta-Physics of the Nyāya-Vaisheshika System of Philosophy (2012) by Jagadish C Chatterji.
2. Natural Realism and Contact Theory of Perception: Indian Philosophy’s Challenge to Contemporary Paradigms of Knowledge (2019) by Chittaranjan Naik.
3. On the Existence of the Self (2021) by Chittaranjan Naik.
4. Apaurusheyatva of the Vedas by Pingali Gopal and Chittaranjan Naik.
5. The Sword of Kali by Chittarnjan Naik.
6. From Shiva to Schrödinger: Unravelling Cosmic Secrets with Trika Shaivism and Quantum Insights (2024) by Dr Mrittunjoy Guha Majumdar.
7. Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy (1997) by Ramakrishna Puligandla.
8. Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies (1999) by Karl H. Potter.
9. Methods of Knowledge – According to Advaita Vedānta (1965) by Swami Satprakashananda.
10. Nyāya Theory of Knowledge: A Critical Study of Some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics (2015) by Satischandra Chatterjee.
11. The Tao of Physics (2007) by Fritjof Capra.

https://www.brhat.in/dhiti/fundamentals-of-nyaya-vaisheshika

https://www.brhat.in/dhiti/fundamentals-of-nyaya-vaisheshika-2

https://www.brhat.in/dhiti/fundamentals-of-nyaya-vaisheshika-3

https://www.brhat.in/dhiti/fundamentals-of-nyaya-vaisheshika-4